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NOTES 
Not As Bad As We Thought  
THE LEGACY OF GEIER V. AMERICAN HONDA 
MOTOR COMPANY IN PRODUCT LIABILITY 
PREEMPTION* 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
[I]n federal preemption, the court decides as a matter of federal law 
that the relevant federal statute or regulation reflects, expressly or 
impliedly, the intent of Congress to displace state law, including 
state tort law, with the federal statute or regulation. The question of 
preemption is thus a question of federal law, and a determination 
that there is preemption nullifies otherwise operational state law.1  
This statement cuts to the heart of why preemption2 is 
such a powerful, confusing and controversial area of federal 
law. By declaring that federal law preempts state actions3 in a 
  
 * © 2005 Mason A. Barney. All Rights Reserved. 
 1 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODUCT LIABILITY § 4, cmt. e (1998). 
 2 There is a difference of opinion on how to spell “preemption.” The modern 
Supreme Court appears to prefer the “pre-emption” spelling. E.g., Geier v. Am. Honda 
Motors Co., 529 U.S. 861, 867 (2000); Freightliner Corp. v. Myrick, 514 U.S. 280, 287 
(1995); English v. Gen. Elec. Co., 496 U.S. 72, 79 (1990); Jones v. Rath Packing, Co., 
430 U.S. 519, 525 (1976). In contrast, most scholars on the topic appear to prefer the 
“preemption” spelling. E.g., Mary J. Davis, Unmasking the Presumption in Favor of 
Preemption, 53 S.C. L. REV. 967 (2002); Caleb Nelson, Preemption, 86 VA. L. REV. 225 
(2000); Stephen A. Gardbaum, The Nature of Preemption, 79 CORNELL L. REV. 767 
(1994). Since it is a scholarly work, this Note shall use the “preemption” spelling. 
 3 The term “state action[s]” as used in this note refers to both state 
legislatures creation of legislation and state judicial consideration of tort cases based 
on either state common law or state legislation. 
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given field, a judge permanently displaces all state claims 
within the scope of the federal law.4 This is the powerful aspect 
of preemption.5 However, because preemption rests upon the 
intent of Congress, a difficult concept to pin down under the 
best of circumstances, it remains (and probably will always be) 
a confusing and sometimes unpredictable area of federal law.6  
This Note will examine the impact one case, Geier v. 
American Honda Motors Company,7 has had on the preemption 
doctrine as it applies to all product liability cases. In Geier, the 
Supreme Court considered the question of whether the federal 
regulation8 concerning the need for passive restraint 
technology9 in new cars preempted the plaintiff’s claim of 
defective design against Honda for not manufacturing the 1987 
Honda Accord with a driver’s side air bag.10 The Court found 
Geier’s claim to be preempted because it “would stand as an 
obstacle” to the Department of Transportation’s (DOT) 
objectives for FMVSS 208.11 A number of authors, including 
Justice Stevens for the dissent in Geier, declared that the 
  
 4 Several authors have referred to this type of action as “jurispathic,” 
because, through federal preemption, a court can “kill” an entire segment of state law. 
Robert M. Cover, The Supreme Court 1982 Term: Foreword: Nomos and Narrative, 97 
HARV. L. REV. 4, 40 (1983). See also S. Candice Hoke, Preemption Pathologies and Civic 
Republican Values, 71 B.U. L. REV. 685, 694 (1991) (noting how a preemption ruling is 
almost always “jurispathic” in result). 
 5 See Hoke supra note 4, at 690-99 (declaring how the power of preemption 
rests in its ability to remove topics from the reach of state law). 
 6 Lorillard Tobacco Co. v. Reilly, 533 U.S. 525, 540 (2001) (stating that the 
court has over the years found the Supremacy Clause, a relatively clear and simple 
statement, very difficult to interpret consistently). 
 7 529 U.S. 861 (2000). 
 8 The regulation in question in Geier was Federal Motor Vehicle Safety 
Standard 208. 49 C.F.R. §571.208 (1984) [hereinafter FMVSS 208]. The Geier suit only 
dealt with the 1984 version of the FMVSS 208. See Geier, 529 U.S. at 864.  
 9 Passive restraint technology is an automotive industry term referring to 
devices that protect the car’s occupants in the event of a crash without requiring the 
occupant to actively engage the technology. Air bags, for example, automatically deploy 
in a crash without the driver having to perform any action beyond the normal 
operation of the car. On the other hand, regular seatbelts require the passenger to 
buckle them in order for them to be effective. Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass'n of the United 
States, Inc. v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 34-35 (1983) (hereinafter 
“State Farm”). See also 49 C.F.R. § 571.208 (2003) (requiring cars to meet the 
requirements using technology “that require no action by vehicle occupants”). In 1987, 
when Geier’s Honda was manufactured, the only passive restraint systems that could 
satisfy the standard were airbags and automatic seatbelts. State Farm, 463 U.S. at 35 
(1983). 
 10 Geier, 529 U.S. at 864-65 (stating that the plaintiff’s suit arose from 
injuries sustained in 1992 when the plaintiff crashed her 1987 Honda Accord, equipped 
only with seat belts, into a tree). 
 11 Id. at 886 (internal quotations omitted). 
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decision shifted the balance of the federal and state power,12 
further “muddled” the already confusing preemption doctrine13 
and limited many individuals’ rights to recover damages.14  
In contrast to this position, this Note will argue that 
these declarations of doom were premature and exaggerated. 
Geier provides an excellent example of the Court’s modern 
approach to implied preemption, the case represents a 
refinement of the current preemption methodology without 
adversely affecting the way lower courts evaluate the federal-
state balance.  
Section II of this Note examines the history of federal 
preemption that shaped the Court’s decision in Geier. Section II 
first examines why the framers of the Constitution thought it 
necessary to expressly declare federal law’s supremacy over 
state law. Next, Section II briefly reviews the important 
preemption principles that developed over the last century. 
Section III of this Note summarizes the Supreme Court’s 
decision in Geier and comments on Justice Breyer’s reasoning. 
Section IV reviews the important effects of the Geier decision, 
and argues that those effects are logical extensions of the 
existing preemption doctrine. Finally, Section V provides 
several examples of how lower courts, and subsequently the 
Supreme Court, have interpreted and utilized the Geier 
decision. This last section includes a detailed look at the 
Supreme Court’s decision in Sprietsma v. Mercury Marine,15 
which provides some validation that the lower courts have been 
interpreting Geier correctly. 
  
 12 See id. at 906-07 (Steven, J., dissenting) (discussing how the majority has 
ignored the presumption against preemption, and forced the state plaintiff to show 
instead that their action does not interfere with the federal government’s regulation). 
 13 Susan Raeker-Jordan, A Study in Judicial Sleight of Hand: Did Geier v. 
American Honda Motor Co. Eradicate the Presumption Against Preemption?, 17 BYU J. 
PUB. L. 1, 3 (2002) (“[t]he Geier Court, . . . further muddl[ed] long standing preemption 
doctrine . . . .”); Nelson, supra note 2, at 232 (“Most commentators who write about 
preemption agree on at least one thing: Modern preemption jurisprudence is a 
muddle.”). 
 14 Stacey Allen Carroll, Federal Preemption of State Products Liability 
Claims: Adding Clarity and Respect for State Sovereignty to the Analysis of Federal 
Preemption Defenses, 36 GA. L. REV. 797, 819 (2002) (declaring that among Geier’s 
many damaging potential effects, one was that the holding “eviscerated the possibility 
of recovery for many injured plaintiffs”). 
 15 537 U.S. 51 (2002). 
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II.  BACKGROUND AND HISTORY OF PREEMPTION 
Since the founding of this nation the preemption of state 
actions has been a hotly debated topic. The Constitution’s 
Supremacy Clause declares: “[t]his Constitution, and the Laws 
of the United States which shall be made in Pursuance thereof; 
. . . shall be the supreme Law of the Land . . . .”16 From this 
“relatively clear and simple mandate,”17 grew most of the 
complex federal preemption doctrine.18 The doctrine's evolution 
began at the inception of the nation and it has continued to be 
refined up to the present day.19 The modern doctrine that has 
developed out of this evaluation is a complex one, which 
attempts to maintain a balance between the federal 
government and the states and contains inherent safeguards to 
preserve this balance. 
A.  The Origins of Federal Supremacy 
The modern preemption doctrine, as embodied in the 
Supremacy Clause, was originally considered necessary to 
remedy one of the major deficiencies of the Articles of 
Confederation. Before the Constitution, the Articles of 
Confederation declared: “[e]very State shall abide by the 
determination of the United States in Congress assembled, on 
all questions which by this confederation are submitted to 
them.”20 Under this Article, however, the state and federal 
  
 16 U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2. 
 17 Lorillard Tobacco Co. v. Reilly, 533 U.S. 525, 540 (2001) (stating that the 
court has over the years found the Supremacy Clause, a relatively clear and simple 
statement, very difficult to consistently interpret). 
 18 It is important to note that not all federal preemption occurs strictly under 
the Supremacy Clause. For example preemption can also occur under the dormant 
commerce clause or the privileges and immunities clause. Additionally, in order for a 
federal action to have preemptive effect it must first be a valid exercise of federal 
power. See ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, 303 (2001) (summarizing the 
various ways Congress can limit state regulatory and taxing power). But see 
Gardbaum, supra note 2 (arguing that contrary to the mainstream opinion, supremacy 
of federal law and the preemption of state law are in fact two different legal concepts, 
and for the sake of clarity of the doctrine should not be viewed as the same). Gardbaum 
argues that a supremacy doctrine should be used on a case-by-case basis to determine 
which law, state or federal, should apply, whereas a preemption doctrine should be 
used when Congress has explicitly stripped a state of jurisdiction in a given area. Id. 
 19 See Gardbaum, supra note 2, at 785-807 (providing a detailed 
“Constitutional History of Preemption”); Davis, supra note 2 at 972-1005 (discussing 
the history of preemption in the 20th century). 
 20 ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION art. XIII. See generally Nelson, supra note 2, 
at 247 n.66 (providing a history of supremacy in the United States, including 
supremacy under the Articles of Confederation). 
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judicial systems operated completely independent of one 
another.21 This separate and equal existence meant that state 
judges were not bound to enforce the determinations of 
Congress unless the state legislature passed a law 
implementing the congressional act.22 This practice allowed 
states to sidestep federal legislation they considered to be 
against their interests. If an individual state did not agree with 
Congress on an issue, the state could simply not enact any 
enforcing legislation.23 Consequently, the effectiveness of the 
central government under the Articles of Confederation was 
severely limited even over those areas where the Articles gave 
the central government control.24 Having learned from the 
weaknesses of the Articles of Confederation,25 the Constitution’s 
framers not only required states to enforce federal law,26 but 
made federal law the “highest in authority” in every state.27  
  
 21 See THE FEDERALIST No. 44, at 236 (James Madison) (George W. Carey, 
James McClellan ed., 2001) (stating that, during the writing of the Constitution, many 
state constitutions did not even recognize the existence of the federal government). 
 22 Nelson, supra note 2, at 247; THE FEDERALIST No. 15, at 71 (Alexander 
Hamilton) (George W. Carey, James McClellan ed., 2001) (referring to the 
ineffectiveness of laws passed by Congress under the Articles of Confederation, 
Hamilton stated: “in practice they are mere recommendations which the States observe 
or disregard at their option.”). See also Gerald Gunther, The Supremacy Clause: The 
Central Element of the Constitutional Scheme, in OUR PECULIAR SECURITY: THE 
WRITTEN CONSTITUTION AND LIMITED GOVERNMENT 133, 136-37 (Eugene W. Hickock 
Jr. et al. eds. 1993) (stating that under the Articles of Confederation there was an 
“absence of machinery to enforce national measures . . . against individuals”). 
 23 See Gunther, supra note 22, at 136 (arguing that the idea of supremacy of 
the federal government was not a new idea to the Constitution and that the problem 
with the supremacy of the Articles of Confederation arose from their implementation 
and not their underlying theory). See e.g., Nelson, supra note 2, at 248-250 (discussing 
how after the Treaty of Peace which ended the revolutionary war, the states and 
Congress disagreed over whether the Treaty automatically became part of every state’s 
laws and therefore overrode previous or subsequent state acts that ran counter to it). 
 24 See THE FEDERALIST No. 44, at 236 (James Madison) (George W. Carey, 
James McClellan ed., 2001) (arguing in favor of the need for the Supremacy Clause by 
comparing the powers of Congress under a Constitution without the Supremacy Clause 
to “the same impotent condition with [Congress under the Articles of Confederation]”).  
 25 See id. (giving four reasons why, in comparison to the government under 
the Articles of Confederation, the Supremacy Clause was necessary; 1) the federal 
Constitution made the state sovereign powers, and therefore as such they could 
potentially have annulled any act performed under a power beyond that granted the 
Congress under the Articles of Confederation; 2) many of the state constitutions did not 
recognize the federal government, and without the Supremacy Clause, in those states, 
the power of the federal government could be questioned; 3) since the constitutions of 
the states are different, a federal law or treaty might conflict with some and not with 
others, thereby making federal law applicable in some states and not in others; and 4) 
without the Supremacy Clause, the federal government would be at the mercy of every 
state government, creating “a monster, in which the head was under the direction of 
the members.”). 
 26 U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2 (“This Constitution, and the Laws of the United 
States . . . shall be the supreme Law of the Land; and the Judges in every State shall 
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Despite this apparent agreement about the necessity of 
the Supremacy Clause, even from the early history of the 
republic,28 settling on where the federal law ends and state law 
begins has always been a contentious issue.29 According to the 
Supreme Court, the question of where to draw this line is a 
matter of Congressional intent.30 Framing the decision to 
preempt in terms of Congressional intent may have made the 
preemption doctrine more difficult to implement, but it was the 
correct approach.31 It is correct because as shown, the framers 
unquestioningly made congressional laws supreme over the 
  
be bound thereby, any Thing in the . . . Laws of any State to the Contrary 
notwithstanding.”). 
 27 Nelson, supra note 2, at 250-252 (describing why the framers thought it 
important to include the Supremacy Clause). Additionally Nelson stated that both 
Samuel Johnson in his 1785 dictionary of the English language, and Chief Justice 
Marshall in his article in defense of McCulloch v. Maryland, defined supreme to mean 
“highest in authority.” Id. at 250. 
  28 See, e.g., Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1, 3 (1824) (declaring that 
New York’s grant of a monopoly over the water transportation in New York harbor “in 
collision with the acts of Congress regulating the coasting trade, which being made in 
pursuance of the Constitution, are supreme, and the State laws must yield to that 
supremacy. . . .”); McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 436 (1819). The 
Court stated: 
[T]he states have no power, by taxation or otherwise, to retard, impede, bur-
den, or in any manner control, the operation of the constitutional laws en-
acted by Congress to carry into execution the power vested in the general 
government. This is, we think, the unavoidable consequence of that suprem-
acy which the Constitution has declared. 
Id. See also HERBERT A. JOHNSON, THE CHIEF JUSTICESHIP OF JOHN MARSHALL 1801–
1835, at 140-47 (1997) (discussing McCulloch’s position as Marshall’s premier opinion 
defining the federal-state balance, but acknowledging that even after the opinion, there 
was still considerable debate over federal supremacy, to the point that Marshall later 
wrote anonymous essays replying to numerous attacks on the very concept of federal 
supremacy). 
 29 See Lorillard Tobacco Co. v. Reilly, 533 U.S. 525, 540-41 (2001) (“[The 
Supremacy Clause] has generated considerable discussion in cases where we have had 
to discern whether Congress has preempted state action in a particular area.”). 
 30 English v. Gen. Elec. Co., 496 U.S. 72, 78-79 (1990) (“[p]re-emption 
fundamentally is a question of congressional intent.”). 
 31 See Geier v. Am. Honda Motors Co., 529 U.S. 861, 907-908 (2000) (Stevens, 
J., dissenting) (arguing that placing the power of preemption in Congress’s hands is 
correct as an inherent structural safeguard to the preemption principle). Justice 
Stevens declared that Congress, as the branch which most represents the interests of 
the states, would be the best branch to balance the power between the federal 
government and the state. Id. at 908. This is also not just Justice Stevens’ theory. In 
the Unfunded Mandates Reform Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-4, 109 Stat 48 (codified in 
scattered sections of 2 U.S.C), Congress ordered the Congressional Budget Office to 
review all legislation coming out of committee for potential unfunded mandates that 
the legislation will place on the states, especially areas where the federal law will 
preempt state laws. CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET OFFICE, PREEMPTIONS IN FEDERAL 
LEGISLATION IN THE 106TH CONGRESS (JUNE 2001), available at ftp://ftp.cbo.gov/ 
28xx/doc2885/Preemptions.pdf.  
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states.32 Additionally, as Justice Marshal in McCulloch phrased 
it, Congress may choose whatever means it deems “necessary 
and proper . . . for carrying its powers into execution.”33 
Therefore, the decision of whether it is “necessary and proper” 
to preempt state law is a decision Congress must make and 
determining its intent is the “ultimate touchstone” of every 
preemption analysis.34  
Determining whether Congress intended to preempt a 
given state action is, however, a difficult proposition.35 It is 
impossible for Congress to articulate for every conceivable 
situation whether it intended to preempt the state law at 
issue.36 Rather, courts are charged with determining on a case-
by-case basis whether Congress intended to preempt the 
particular state action. Since Congress rarely speaks with one 
voice in giving its reasons for enacting a law, the Supreme 
Court has stated that, as an initial matter, “evidence of 
preemptive purpose [should be] sought in the text and 
structure of the statute at issue.”37  
However, a statute’s text often does not clearly evince 
Congress’s intent.38 In these instances, courts must often resort 
  
 32 Yet, the federal government is inherently a government of limited power, 
and its laws are superior to state laws only when it acts within one of its enumerated 
powers. See CHEMERINSKY, supra note 18, at 304. 
 33 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) at 324. See also Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc, 505 
U.S. 504, 516 (1992) (declaring that since McCulloch, it has been clear that any “state 
law that conflicts with federal law is ‘without effect.’”); THE FEDERALIST No. 33 at 158-
161 (Alexander Hamilton) (George W. Carey, James McClellan ed., 2001) (arguing that 
the Supremacy Clause and the Necessary and Proper Clause are merely truisms which 
cannot exist without each other). 
 34 Cipollone, 505 U.S. at 516 (quoting Malone v. White Motor Corp., 435 U.S. 
497, 504 (1978) (quoting Retail Clerks v. Schermerhorn, 375 U.S. 96, 103 (1963))). 
 35 Hines v. Davidowitz 312 U.S. 52, 67 (1941) (“There is not—and from the 
very nature of the problem there cannot be—any rigid formula or rule which can be 
used as a universal pattern to determine the meaning and purpose of every act of 
Congress.”). 
 36 See Malone, 435 U.S. at 504 (stating that Congress rarely indicates its 
preemptive intent clearly). When courts talk about preempting state law, they 
sometimes will also include state common law. Compare Cipollone, 505 U.S. at 521 
(discussing how the phrase chosen by Congress to discuss the state laws it intended to 
preempt was broad and included state common law as well as positive state 
enactments) with Geier, 529 U.S. at 868 (declaring that the express preemption clause 
in the Federal Motor Vehicles Safety Act does not automatically preempt state common 
law because of the saving clause). 
 37 CXS Transp. v. Easterwood, 507 U.S. 658, 664 (1993) (evaluating the reach 
of the express preemption clause in the Federal Railroad Safety Act, Justice White first 
analyzed the words in the clause to see if the words provided any guidance as to 
Congress’s preemptive intent). 
 38 See Colon ex rel. Molina v. BIC USA, Inc., 136 F. Supp. 2d 196, 202-05 
(S.D.N.Y. 2000) (discussing the difficulty of discerning Congress’s preemptive intent 
when the Consumer Product Safety Act contains both an express preemption clause, 
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to using circumstantial evidence, like the history surrounding 
the law or regulation,39 or an implementing agency's post hoc 
opinion of the act,40 to determine whether Congress intended to 
preempt the state action.41 One illustration of how problematic 
this determination can be is the fact that the Supreme Court 
has attempted to tackle preemption questions no fewer than 
300 times in the past fifty years.42 Simply by virtue of this 
volume of decisions, it is easy to understand why the resulting 
doctrine is quite convoluted.43 
B.  How Congress Can Preempt State Actions 
The complexity of the preemption problem has created a 
doctrine where by Congress is said to have preempted state 
actions in a variety of different situations. Beginning in the 
early part of the 20th century,44 the Court recognized that a 
state action could be preempted in two ways—either expressly 
or impliedly.45 Express preemption occurs when Congress 
  
and a saving clause that states that compliance with the Act does not exempt an 
individual from common law liability). 
 39 Geier was by no means the first case where the Supreme Court used 
resources beyond the text of the statute to interpret Congress’s intent. In what 
Professor Gardbaum believed was the genesis of modern implied preemption theory, 
Gardbaum, supra note 2, at 807, the Court in Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator, 331 U.S. 218 
(1947), relied heavily on statutory history in holding that the Warehouse Act implicitly 
preempted state regulatory actions regarding Warehouse rates. Id. at 232. 
 40 See e.g., Geier v. Am. Honda Motors Co., 529 U.S. 861, 875-85 (2000) (using 
the Department of Transportation’s evaluation of the preemptive effects of the 
regulation in making the Court’s final determination); Hillsborough County, Fla. v. 
Automated Med. Labs., Inc., 471 U.S. 707 (1985) (evaluating an action challenging the 
constitutionality of local ordinances governing blood donation, the Court placed a good 
deal of emphasis on the Food and Drug Administration’s intention not to preempt state 
actions). 
 41 See S. Doc. No. 103-6, at 917-19 (1992) (Supp. S. Doc. No. 106-27 (2000)) at 
918 (describing for U.S. Senators the role of the courts and the methods the courts 
employ when deciding a preemption case), available at http://www.gpoaccess.gov/ 
constitution/pdf/con009.pdf.  
 42 Davis, supra note 2, at 969 n.9 (describing how there had been 
approximately 150 Supreme Court decisions concerning preemption between 1940 and 
1980, and then approximately another 150 decisions on the subject between 1980 and 
2000). 
 43 See Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67 (1941) (stating that it is 
impossible to formulate a simple “yardstick” or “infallible” test; preemption inherently 
requires a complex analysis without a “clear distinctly marked formula”). 
 44 Professor Davis has argued that much of modern preemption doctrine was 
developed as a response to the expansion of congressional power during the New Deal. 
Davis, supra note 2, at 978. 
 45 See Jones v. Savage, 225 U.S. 501, 533 (1912) (“For when the question is 
whether a Federal act overrides a state law, the entire scheme of the statute must, of 
course, be considered, and that which needs must be implied is of no less force than 
that which is expressed.”). 
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declares within a statute its intention to preempt state laws 
governing the same issue as the federal law.46 Conversely, 
implied preemption occurs when an act’s “structure and 
purpose”47 suggest that Congress intended federal law to 
supersede state actions governing the same field or issue.48  
The Supreme Court has accepted two different 
categories of implied preemption. One category of preemption, 
called “field preemption,” is found where Congress legislates a 
field so completely that it is clear Congress intended the 
federal government to have exclusive jurisdiction in that field.49 
The second category of implied preemption is broadly referred 
to as “implied conflict preemption,” or just “conflict 
preemption.”50 Conflict preemption can be found in two different 
situations. One instance of conflict preemption is when the 
state action is incompatible with the congressional law, such as 
when it is physically impossible for an individual to 
simultaneously comply with both the federal law and the state 
law.51 This is often referred to as “physical impossibility” 
conflict preemption.52 The other situation where conflict 
preemption occurs is where the state action will stand as an 
  
 46 English v. Gen. Elec. Co., 496 U.S. 72, 79 (1990) (“[W]hen Congress has 
made its intent known through explicit statutory language, the court’s task is an easy 
one.”). E.g., Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc, 505 U.S. 504 (1992) (holding that the 
section of the Public Health Cigarette Smoking Act of 1969 which stated “no statement 
relating to smoking and health, other than the statement required by section 4 of this 
act, shall be required on any cigarette package” expressly showed Congress’s intent to 
preempt all state laws relating to the labeling of cigarette packages).  
 47 Jones v. Rath Packing 430 U.S. 519, 529 (1976) (“[State law is preempted] 
whether Congress’s command is explicitly stated in the statute’s language or implicitly 
contained in its structure and purpose.”). 
 48 E.g., Buckman Co. v. Plaintiffs’ Legal Comm., 531 U.S. 341 (2001) 
(dismissing plaintiff’s state law “fraud on the FDA” claim, because such a claim would 
stand as an obstacle to the flexibility built into the Food and Drug Administration’s 
regulatory process, and therefore was implicitly preempted by the Food, Drug, and 
Cosmetic Act).  
 49 E.g., Napier v. Atl. Coast Line R.R. Co., 272 U.S. 605 (1926) (affirming the 
judgment of the Wisconsin Supreme Court that in delegating authority to the 
Interstate Commerce Commission over “the design, construction and material of every 
part of the locomotive,” Congress had occupied the field of locomotive safety and had 
excluded all state actions on the topic); Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator 331 U.S. 218, 230 
(1947) (“The scheme of federal regulation may be so pervasive as to make reasonable 
the inference that Congress left no room for the States to supplement it.”). 
 50 See Gibbons v. Ogden 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1 (1824) (declaring that since the 
New York grant and the Federal license conflict, the New York grant can not be 
allowed to stand). 
 51 Florida Lime & Avocado Growers, Inc. v. Paul, 373 U.S. 132, 142-143 
(1963) (“A holding of federal exclusion of state law is inescapable, and requires no 
inquiry into congressional design, where compliance with both federal and state 
regulations is a physical impossibility . . . .”).  
 52 Carroll, supra note 14, at 821. 
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obstacle to the federal law’s objectives.53 Commentators often 
refer to this latter form of conflict preemption as “obstacle 
preemption” or “frustration of purpose preemption.”54 
The Supreme Court in Geier ultimately rested their 
decision on an obstacle preemption theory.55 The Court’s 
majority based this conclusion on the idea that the plaintiff’s 
tort claim would frustrate the Department of Transportation’s 
objectives for FMVSS 208.56 Despite the Court’s recent reliance 
on obstacle preemption in Geier, this type of preemption has 
long been the most contentious.57 Most commentators have been 
concerned about the expansion of obstacle preemption due to 
its inherent ability for courts to manipulate a perceived 
congressional objective.58 This issue of what were Congress’s 
objectives was, in fact, the major disagreement between the 
majority and dissent in Geier. Justice Breyer, writing for the 
majority, declared the objective of FMVSS 208 to be the 
“gradual phase-in of passive restraints.”59 Conversely, Justice 
Stevens, writing for the dissent, stated the objective to be the 
  
 53 Hines v. Davidowitz 312 U.S. 52, 67 (1941) (“Our primary function is to 
determine whether, under the circumstances of this particular case, [the state law] 
stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and 
objectives of Congress.”). E.g., Carrasquilla v. Mazda Motor Corp., 166 F. Supp. 2d 169 
(M.D. Pa. 2001) (finding that a “shoulder-only” automatic seat belt defective design 
claim would stand as an obstacle to FMVSS 208’s objective of offering manufacturers a 
choice of restraint technologies). See also Nelson, supra note 2, at 265-70 (discussing 
how the Supreme Court in Perez v. Campbell, 402 U.S. 637, 650 (1971), traced the 
origins of obstacle preemption back to a quote from Chief Justice Marshall’s decision in 
Gibbons v. Ogden, “‘acts of the State Legislatures . . . [which] interfere with, or are 
contrary to the laws of Congress, made in pursuance of the Constitution,’ are invalid 
under the Supremacy Clause”). 
 54 Stephen R. Bough & Lynn R. Johnson, Crossing the Center Line: 
Preemption in Automobile Product Liability Cases, 57 J. MO. B. 30, 31 (2001) (“Obstacle 
or frustration of purpose preemption is quite common, and is found where state laws 
frustrate the purpose behind the federal statutes regulating the same subject matter.”). 
 55 Geier, 529 U.S. at 881 (holding that the plaintiff’s tort action creating a 
duty to install airbags on all 1987 cars would present an obstacle to the mix of passive 
restraint devices sought by the federal regulation). 
 56 See discussion infra Part II.B. 
 57 Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator 331 U.S. 218, 231 (1947) (Referring to obstacle 
preemption, the court stated, “[i]t is often a perplexing question whether Congress has 
precluded state action or by the choice of selective regulatory measures has left the 
police power of the state undisturbed except as the state and federal regulations 
collide”). 
 58 The Supreme Court 1999 Term—Leading Cases, (pt. III A) 114 HARV. L. 
REV. 339, 345-46 (2000) [hereinafter Supreme Court 1999, Leading Cases] (quoting 
Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. at 67) (“Because obstacle preemption relies by definition 
on the ‘full purposes and objectives of Congress,’ its boundaries are somewhat 
indeterminate.”). See Davis, supra note 2, at 1021 (discussing how obstacle preemption 
eradicated the presumption against preemption and ultimately leads to a presumption 
in favor of preemption). 
 59 Geier, 529 U.S. at 879. 
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general reduction in automotive related injuries.60 The 
majority’s narrowly defined objective resulted in more state 
actions conflicting with it, whereas the dissent’s more broadly 
defined objective was harmonious with more state actions, 
thereby preserving those actions.61 Despite all this, however, it 
is important to remember that the category distinctions for 
preemption (express preemption, physical impossibility 
preemption, field preemption, and obstacle preemption) are by 
no means rigid, and the lines between them are often unclear.62  
C.  The Presumption Against Preemption 
The presumption against preemption is an additional 
rule of interpretation that the Supreme Court and 
commentators have often cited as a limitation to federal 
preemption.63 In an oft-cited passage,64 the Supreme Court in 
Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp.65 explained that an analysis of a 
  
 60 Id. at 889 (Stevens, J. dissenting). This disagreement was due in large 
measure to the fact that Justice Stevens was taking as the congressional objective only 
the objective stated in the Safety Act. Id. Justice Breyer however chose to say that the 
congressional objective was in fact the DOT’s objective since the DOT was the rule 
making body as concerns FMVSS 208. Id. at 874-75 (Breyer, J. majority).  
 61 Supreme Court 1999, Leading Cases, supra note 58, at 345 (pointing out 
that the majority’s narrower objective had a broader “preemptive scope” than the 
dissent’s looser objective).  
 62 English v. Gen. Elec. Co., 496 U.S. 72, 79 n.5 (1990) (discussing how this 
framework is not “rigidly distinct,” but that since it had been previously recognized 
that the court believed it appropriate to invoke it generally). An excellent example of 
the vagueness of this line comes from Cipollone v. Liggett Group Inc., 505 U.S. at 518. 
As Justice Thomas later explained it in Freightliner Corp. v. Myrick, the Court in 
Cipollone first stated that it must analyze the case using only the express preemption 
clause in the Federal Cigarette Labeling and Advertising Act, but then two paragraphs 
later engaged in a clear conflict preemption analysis. Freightliner Corp. v. Myrick 514 
U.S. 208, 288-289 (1995) (citing Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 505 U.S. 504, 518 
(1992)). 
 63 See English, 496 U.S. at 79 (stating that the court has been hesitant to find 
field preemption in areas governed by the presumption against preemption); 
Hillsborough County, Fla. v. Automated Med. Labs., Inc., 471 U.S. 707, 715-716 (1985) 
(describing how the presumption against preemption made the court less inclined to 
find the local ordinance implicitly preempted, because an ordinance regulating the 
safety of blood plasma dealt with the health of the state’s citizens, a field traditionally 
occupied by the state). 
 64 According to the Westlaw Online Custom Digest for the presumption 
KeyCite (KeyCite 360k18.3), Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218 (1947) had 
been cited 781 times as of Feb. 2, 2005. This makes Rice the most frequently cited case 
for this proposition. See also Gardbaum, supra note 2, at 807 (stating that the Rice 
decision was the “locus classicus” of the modern preemption doctrine, and that it is the 
most cited statement of the presumption against preemption). 
 65 331 U.S. 218 (1947) (deciding, in light of the state’s long standing interest 
in internal state commerce, if the Illinois Commerce Commission had been preempted 
from adjudicating complaints concerning unjust and excessive rates for the storage of 
grain). 
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preemption issue begins “with the assumption that the historic 
police powers of the state were not to be superseded by the 
federal act unless that was the clear and manifest purpose of 
Congress.”66 While the presumption has had a limited effect in 
the area of express preemption,67 its effects have been far 
greater in the area of implied preemption.68 According to the 
Court, the presumption against preemption is a counterweight 
against the judiciary’s tendency towards giving an expansive 
interpretation to ambiguous congressional intent.69 As Justice 
Thurgood Marshall explained, the real purpose behind the 
presumption is to ensure that the carefully established balance 
between the federal government and the states is not 
“disturbed unintentionally by Congress or unnecessarily by the 
courts.”70 
While serving an important role in preserving the 
federal-state balance, the presumption against preemption is 
nevertheless only a tool of interpretation.71 Rather than stifling 
  
 66 Id. at 230. While not an issue in Geier, it is important to note that a 
threshold inquiry to the presumption is its applicability only in areas of historic state 
control. In areas that have traditionally been regulated by the federal government, like 
the nuclear power industry, the presumption against preemption does not apply. E.g., 
Silkwood v. Kerr-McGee Corp., 464 U.S. 238, 248-249 (1984) (discussing the federal 
government’s long standing occupation of all regulations relating to the field of nuclear 
power). Additionally, the court in Rice also stated that the “clear and manifest purpose 
of Congress” could be established through either express or implied preemption 
theories. 331 U.S. at 230.  
 67 See Cipollone, 505 U.S. at 518 (Stevens plurality opinion) (Discussing an 
express preemption clause, the plurality declared “we must construe these provisions 
in light of the presumption against the preemption of state police power relations. This 
presumption reinforces the appropriateness of a narrow reading of [the express 
preemption clause].”) (emphasis added). But see Nelson, supra note 2, at 293-94 
(questioning the appropriateness of the application of the presumption against 
preemption to express preemption clauses, especially since Congress, in theory, has 
already taken into account state interests when it wrote the law, and therefore 
asserting that there is no need, as a rule of statutory interpretation, to give those same 
interests a preferable standing). 
 68 See Nelson, supra note 2, at 293 (stating that that the courts have always 
required “persuasive reasons” when declaring a state law to be preempted by 
implication of federal law); Florida Lime & Avocado Growers, Inc v. Paul, 373 U.S. 132, 
142 (1964) (“[F]ederal regulation of a field of commerce should not be deemed 
preemptive of state regulatory power in the absence of persuasive reasons.”).  
 69 Geier v. Am. Honda Motors Co., 529 U.S. 861, 907 (2000) (Stevens, J., 
dissenting) (“[T]he presumption serves as a limiting principle that prevents federal 
judges from running amok with our potentially boundless . . . doctrine of implied 
conflict preemption . . . .”). 
 70 Jones v. Rath Packing Co., 430 U.S. 519, 525 (1977); See United States v. 
Bass 404 U.S. 336, 349 (1971) (“[U]nless Congress conveys its purpose clearly, it will 
not be deemed to have significantly changed the federal-state balance.”). 
 71 See Gardbaum, supra note 2, at 805-07 (describing the history behind the 
presumption, and clearly stating that it was a creation of the court to help it in 
divining Congress’s intent in implied preemption situations).  
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in any way Congress’s ability to preempt state law, the 
presumption is intended merely to aid the judiciary in 
discerning Congressional intent—the “ultimate touchstone” of 
every preemption case.72 In recent years, many commentators 
have noted that the presumption has somewhat fallen into 
disfavor with the Court.73 However, as a tool of interpretation 
the presumption has been re-interpreted and applied in diverse 
ways by the Court over time.74 While it is true that, in recent 
years, the Supreme Court appears to have invoked the 
presumption by name less frequently,75 it is a mistake to 
conclude that the Court therefore ignored the presumption 
entirely in implied preemption cases.76 Rather, it is more 
accurate to say that the Court simply has found reasons to say 
that the given legislation or regulation overcame the 
presumption against preemption.77 
III.  GEIER V. AMERICAN HONDA MOTOR COMPANY 
In 1992, Alexis Geier hit a tree while driving her 1987 
Honda Accord.78 At the time, she was wearing a manual 
shoulder and lap seat belt—the only passive restraint 
technology the car possessed.79 The car was not equipped with a 
driver’s side air bag.80 After the accident, Ms. Geier and her 
  
 72 Retail Clerks v. Schermerhorn, 375 U.S. 96, 103 (1963). 
 73 See, e.g., Supreme Court 1999, Leading Cases, supra note 58, at 339-40; 
Raeker-Jordan, supra note 13, at 1-3. 
 74 See generally Davis, supra note 2, at 972-97 (providing a detailed history of 
the evolution of the preemption doctrine and specifically the presumption against 
preemption). 
 75 See id. at 990-97 (detailing the use of the presumption against preemption 
in the 1980’s and 1990’s). 
 76 Contra Geier v. Am. Honda Motors Co., 529 U.S. 861, 906-907 (2000) 
(Stevens, J., dissenting) (stating that the majority ignored the presumption and “put 
the burden on petitioners to show that their tort claim would not frustrate the 
Secretary’s purposes”); Raeker-Jordan, supra note 13, at 43-44 (declaring that the 
Geier court departed from its established preemption doctrine and ignored the 
presumption against preemption). 
 77 See discussion infra Part III.B. See also Ernest A. Young, State Sovereign 
immunity and the Future of Federalism, 1999 SUP. CT. REV 1, 40 (1999) (“[O]ne critical 
characteristic of the presumption against preemption is that it can be overcome by an 
adequate showing of Congressional intent . . . .”). Professor Young notes that there are 
very few meaningful limits that can be placed on the preemption doctrine while 
remaining true to the Supremacy Clause. Id. at 40 n.181. As a result, he suggests that 
the Court’s reluctance in recent years to interpret preemption too narrowly stems from 
the Court’s inherently limited political capital and its desire not to enter into direct 
conflict with Congress over the issue. Id. at 38.  
 78 Geier, 529 U.S. at 865. 
 79 Id. 
 80 Id. 
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parents filed a common law claim in the District of Columbia 
against American Honda Motor Company Inc. (Honda), 
alleging that Ms. Geier’s Accord had been negligently and 
defectively designed because it lacked a driver’s side air bag.81 
Honda, however, responded by arguing that the 1984 version82 
of Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standard 208 (FMVSS 208), 
promulgated under the National Traffic and Motor Vehicle 
Safety Act of 1966 (Safety Act), 83 both expressly and impliedly 
preempted any state action against Honda for not installing a 
passive restraint system.84 
A.  The Express Preemption and Saving Clauses 
Justice Breyer, writing for a five-member majority,85 
started his analysis by examining whether the Safety Act’s 
express preemption clause affected Ms. Geier’s action.86 
Contrary to the approach advocated by Honda,87 Justice Breyer 
did not solely look to the text of the Act’s express preemption 
clause,88 stating instead that the express preemption provision 
  
 81 Id.  
 82 Geier’s Honda had been manufactured in 1987 under the 1984 version of 
FMVSS 208. Id. at 864. As a result, the Court only examined the 1984 version of 
FMVSS 208. Id. at 864-65. 
 83 Pub. L. No. 89-563, 80 Stat. 718 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 1381-
1431 (1988)). 
 84 Brief for Respondent at 9, Geier v. Am. Honda Motor Co., 529 U.S. 861 
(2000) (No. 98-1811). In its brief Honda clearly stated that it was worried about 
“massive, repeated, tort liability for having installed seat belts, and not airbags.” Id. at 
7. With that as its primary concern, Honda’s position was that the express preemption 
clause of the Safety Act preempted any attempt by the state to establish any safety 
standard, which Honda argued included the creation of a standard through tort 
actions. Id. Honda contended that the saving clause did not preserve any liability, but 
instead simply precluded a defendant from asserting a defense of compliance with a 
federal standard. Id. at 7-8. While the Court did eventually find that the plaintiff’s 
claims were preempted, it rejected most of Honda’s reasoning for doing so. Geier, 529 
U.S. at 867-68. 
 85 The five member majority consisted of Chief Justice Rehnquist, and 
Associate Justices Breyer, O’Conner, Scalia, and Kennedy. Geier, 529 U.S. at 863. 
 86 Id. at 867. 
 87 Brief for Respondent at 10-14, Geier (advocating that the plain language of 
the express preemption clause showed that it was meant to encompass common law 
actions). 
 88 The Safety Act’s express preemption clause read:  
Whenever a Federal motor vehicle safety standard established under this 
subchapter is in effect, no State or political subdivision of a State shall have 
any authority either to establish, or to continue in effect, with respect to any 
motor vehicle or item of motor vehicle equipment any safety standard appli-
cable to the same aspect of performance of such vehicle or item of equipment 
which is not identical to the Federal standard. 
Geier, 529 U.S. at 867 (quoting 15 U.S.C. § 1392(d) (repealed 1994)) (internal 
quotations omitted). 
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must be interpreted along with the Safety Act’s “saving 
clause.”89 The saving clause stated, “‘[c]ompliance with’ a 
federal safety standard ‘does not exempt any person from any 
liability under common law.’”90  
In holding that “[t]he saving clause assumes that there 
are some significant number of common-law liability cases to 
save,”91 Justice Breyer argued that if the express preemption 
clause applied to common law actions, then there would be 
little, if any, common law liability remaining.92 Yet if Congress 
had intended little or no liability to remain, Justice Breyer 
questioned why the Act would include a saving clause, which 
had no meaning other than to exclude a type of defense to a 
common law tort claim.93 Consequently, he held that a broad 
reading of the express preemption clause could not be correct. 
In order to harmonize the two clauses,94 Justice Breyer declared 
that, read in the “presence of the saving clause,” the express 
preemption clause inherently preempted positive state actions, 
  
 89 Geier, 529 U.S. at 868. Justice Breyer did concede that a broad reading of 
the express preemption clause, without the saving clause, would probably preempt 
common law tort actions as well as positive state legislative enactments. Id. However, 
he points out that such a reading would eliminate all potential liability at common law, 
and he said there was no convincing evidence that Congress sought to do this. Id.  
 90 Id. The full text of the saving clause reads: “[C]ompliance with any Federal 
motor vehicle safety standard issued under this subchapter does not exempt any 
person from any liability under common law.” 15 U.S.C. § 1397(k) (repealed 1994). 
Justice Breyer chose to refer to this clause as the “saving clause” because, in his 
analysis, it preserved, or saved, the common law from being totally preempted by the 
express preemption clause. The term “savings clause” was the term favored in the brief 
by the Solicitor General when referring to §1397(k). Brief for the United States as 
Amicus Curiae Supporting Affirmance at 8, Geier v. Am. Honda Motor Co., 529 U.S. 
861 (2000) (No. 98-1811). To the contrary, Geier, who was advocating that the saving 
clause preserved all tort actions, preferred the term “anti-preemption provision” to 
refer to § 1397(k). Brief for Petitioner at 14, Geier v. Am. Honda Motor Co., 529 U.S. 
861 (2000) (No. 98-1811). 
 91 Geier, 529 U.S. at 868. This statement is probably the single most 
fundamental building block upon which the Court’s interpretation of the express and 
saving clauses rests. 
 92 Id. 
 93 Id. This holding can be understood as a response to the position held by 
Honda and several lower courts that the saving clause merely prohibited a defendant 
from defending an action by asserting compliance with a federal standard. See Brief for 
Respondent at 21-26, Geier; Sprietsma v. Mercury Marine, 729 N.E.2d 45, 49-50 (Ill. 
App. Ct. 2000), aff’d, 757 N.E.2d 75 (Ill. 2001), rev’d, 537 U.S. 51 (2002) (holding, before 
Geier was decided, that the Federal Boating Act’s saving clause, which was worded 
very similarly to the Safety Act’s saving clause, was merely meant to preclude a 
defense of compliance). 
 94 Supreme Court 1999, Leading Cases, supra note 58, at 340-41 
(characterizing Justice Breyer’s decision as harmonizing the preemption and saving 
clauses). 
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such as a legislative enactment, but did not necessarily 
preempt state common law tort actions.95  
Having determined that the saving clause preserved 
some common law actions, Justice Breyer next examined 
whether the clause went further, preserving absolutely all tort 
actions from ever being preempted under the Safety Act.96 He 
concluded, “that the savings clause . . . does not bar the 
ordinary working of conflict preemption principles.”97 Justice 
Breyer reasoned that Congress would not enact legislation that 
required “compliance-with-federal-regulation” as a 
precondition, and then allow states to carve away the 
regulation through common law actions that conflicted with it.98 
It was more likely, in his opinion, that the saving clause was 
designed as a buffer to the express preemption clause to allow 
for some common law liability while still preserving implied 
preemption principles to protect the overall objectives of the 
regulation.99 Justice Breyer stated that, in the past, the Court 
had refused to read a saving clause broadly when such a 
  
 95 Geier, 529 U.S. at 868. See also Rogers v. Cosco 737 N.E.2d 1158 (Ind. Ct. 
App. 2000) (interpreting the Safety Act’s having both a preemption and a saving clause 
as a “congressional compromise” between a national interest in uniformity and a local 
interest in compensating accident victims based upon common law tort standards). 
According to the Indiana Court of Appeals in Rogers, the dichotomy between legislative 
actions versus common law actions should not be taken too literally. Id. at 1164-1165. 
There the defendants argued that the saving clause was inapplicable because the 
Indiana state legislature had included product liability common law negligence actions 
within the framework of its product liability statute. Id. at 1164. The Court of Appeals 
however said that this distinction was without merit because the underlying purpose 
behind the express preemption clause was to bar state courts from enacting motor 
vehicle safety regulations that were different from the national standard. Id. at 1165. 
The appellate court held that it was not Congress’s intent to render inapplicable a 
state’s general common law standards simply because the state chose to codify those 
standards. Id. 
 96 Geier, 529 U.S. at 869. The petitioner (Geier) advocated in her brief that 
the Safety Act’s saving clause exempted all common law actions from the effects of the 
express preemption clause. Brief for Petitioner at 35-41, Geier v. Am. Honda Motor Co., 
519 U.S. 861 (2000) (No. 98-1811). Then she took this argument a step further. Ms. 
Geier asserted that, according to Supreme Court precedent, the inclusion of an express 
preemption clause did not specifically preclude common law actions from being 
impliedly preempted. Id. 
 97 Geier, 529 U.S. at 869. (emphasis added). 
 98 Id. at 869-70. This reading complied with Justice Scalia’s comments in 
Cipollone, where he expressed concern over what he perceived as the Court’s 
declaration that when express preemption exists, implied preemption cannot also exist. 
Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 505 U.S. 504, 547-548 (1992) (Scalia, J. concurring in 
the judgment in part and dissenting in part). In this comment he stated that it would 
be inconsistent with precedent to hold that a state “could impose requirements entirely 
contrary to federal law” so long as they were outside the prescribed scope express 
preemption clause. Id. at 547. 
 99 Geier, 529 U.S. at 870.  
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reading would unbalance an established federal regulatory 
scheme.100 This determination, that in statutes containing both 
an express preemption clause and a saving clause, the 
“ordinary workings of [implied] preemption” still apply,101 has 
proven to be one of Geier’s most important contributions to the 
preemption doctrine.102 
B.  Did Geier’s Action Conflict with FMVSS 208? 
Applying this analysis to the facts at hand, the Court 
identified the major question posed as whether a common law 
“no airbag” action would conflict with FMVSS 208.103 Since 
FMVSS 208 was a regulation promulgated under a 
congressional act, the regulation’s preemptive reach became a 
question of departmental intent.104 To determine whether the 
Department of Transportation (DOT) intended to preempt state 
law, Justice Breyer looked to the history of the regulation, the 
DOT’s comments at the time of FMVSS 208’s promulgation, 
and the department’s current stance on the issue.105 The 
regulation’s history, as presented in the Court’s opinion, 
showed how the DOT had struggled since 1970 to implement a 
passive restraint requirement that would be economical for the 
manufacturers to implement and which the public would 
embrace.106 The Department’s contemporaneous explanation of 
the regulation made clear that there were seven “significant 
considerations” that were taken into account when creating the 
  
 100 Id. (quoting United States v. Locke, 529 U.S. 89, 106-07 (2000)). 
 101 Id. at 869. This was the interpretation advocated by the Solicitor General 
in his brief Amicus Curiae and on behalf of the DOT. Brief for the United States as 
Amicus Curiae Supporting Affirmance at 8-9, Geier. He argued, when Congress 
legislates it always does so “against the background of the Supremacy Clause.” Id. at 
17. Implicit in this background is the understanding that the federal law will always 
prevail when there is a conflict between state and federal law. Id. As a result, unless 
Congress expressly excludes it from implied preemption, common law claims preserved 
by a saving clause, must still be subject to the limitations of implied preemption. Id. 
17-18. If common law actions were allowed to operate outside of implied preemption 
principles, the Solicitor General reasoned that the actions could then undermine the 
congressional objectives for a given regulation. Id. 
 102 See discussion infra Part V.A. 
 103 Geier, 529 U.S. at 874. 
 104 In this situation Justice Breyer stated that “[t]he agency is likely to have a 
thorough understanding of its own regulations and its objective and is ‘uniquely 
qualified’ to comprehend the likely impact of state requirements.” Id. at 883. Therefore, 
he declared that the Agency’s own views should make a difference in the interpretation 
of its own regulation. Id. 
 105 Id. at 874-75, 881.  
 106 Id. at 875-77. 
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regulation.107 The DOT made clear that seatbelts were a critical 
part of overall passenger safety.108 In 1984, less than 20% of 
front seat passengers used manual seatbelts.109 Airbags and 
other passive restraint systems could bridge the safety gap 
created by the lack of individuals using seat belts.110 Yet the 
DOT also had to take into account the fact that passive 
restraint systems had their own problems.111 Non-detachable 
automatic safety belts had their own shortcomings and were 
disliked by the public.112 Moreover, airbags could be hazardous, 
and were significantly more expensive to install and maintain 
than automatic safety belts.113  
The DOT believed that FMVSS 208 had two important 
components that would balance these varying and somewhat 
conflicting considerations.114 The DOT allowed manufacturers to 
choose between several different passive restraint systems.115 
By not mandating a single type of passive restraint system, it 
was thought that manufactures would have more of an 
incentive to explore alternative passive restraint systems in 
the hopes that they could improve the automobile's safety and 
reduce the passive restraint system’s cost.116 In addition to 
offering a choice, FMVSS 208 also allowed the passive restraint 
systems to be phased in gradually between 1986 and 1989.117 
The reason for this was that manufacturers needed time to 
develop improved airbags and alternative passive restraint 
systems.118 The phase-in program was also designed to increase 
public awareness and acceptance of passive restraint systems.119 
To encourage the manufacturers to have a mix of systems that 
would include air bags, FMVSS 208 allowed manufacturers to 
count each vehicle designed with an airbag as 1.5 vehicles for 
purposes of achieving the percentages required by the 
  
 107 Id. at 877-78. 
 108 Geier, 529 U.S. at 877-78. 
 109 Id. 
 110 Id. at 877. 
 111 Id. 
 112 Id.  
 113 Geier, 529 U.S. at 878. 
 114 See id. at 878-79. 
 115 Id. at 878. 
 116 Id. at 879. The Department specifically rejected an “all airbag” standard 
out of safety concerns and a desire to gather more data about the effectiveness of 
alternative passive restraint systems. Id. at 879. 
 117 Id. 
 118 Geier, 529 U.S. at 879. 
 119 Id. at 879. 
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regulation.120 Through the Solicitor General, the DOT informed 
the Court that FMVSS 208 “‘embodies the Secretary’s policy 
judgment that safety would best be promoted if manufacturers 
installed alternative protection systems in their fleets rather 
than one particular system in every car.’”121  
Considering FMVSS 208’s long and complex history, 
Justice Breyer stated that the DOT’s opinion that Ms. Geier’s 
action “stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment [of the 
Department’s objectives],”122 must hold “some weight.”123 He 
declared that since Congress had delegated the regulatory 
authority to the Department, and because the subject was a 
technical one which required a great deal of familiarity with 
the automobile industry, the DOT was “uniquely qualified” to 
determine the impact of a state requirement.124 Justice Breyer 
explained that the factors that DOT weighed when 
promulgating FMVSS 208 were identified over many years of 
experience forming policy around passenger safety.125 It is 
unlikely that a jury or a judge, in a common law situation, 
could have adequately assimilated the technical complexities 
and the public acceptance factors in forming a common law 
judgment that would have satisfied the six factors mentioned 
by the Court.  
An intrinsic part of Geier's claim was that Honda had 
breached its duty to design a safe car by not installing an 
airbag in her Accord.126 Justice Breyer stated that if Geier were 
to win her case, then all new cars sold in 1987 in the District of 
Columbia would have been required to have an air bag.127 
Justice Breyer declared that such a ruling would have 
prevented the “gradual passive restraint phase-in the federal 
regulation deliberately imposed,” and thus stood as “an 
obstacle to the variety and mix of devices” Congress had 
intended.128 For that reason, Justice Breyer held that Geier’s 
  
 120 Id. at 879-80. In previous iterations of FMVSS 208, the DOT had found it 
difficult to get manufacturers to voluntarily install air bags because of the cost of air 
bags was significantly higher than that of automatic seat belts. Id. at 878-879. The air 
bag cost was one of the considerations behind the gradual phase-in program. Id. at 879-
80. 
 121 Id. at 881 (emphasis in original). 
 122 Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Affirmance at 25-
26, Geier. 
 123 Geier, 508 U.S. at 883. 
 124 Id. 
 125 Id. at 877-78. 
 126 Id. at 865, 881. 
 127 Id. at 881. 
 128 Geier, 508 U.S. at 881. 
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state action must be preempted in order to allow the federal 
regulation to achieve the purpose for which it was enacted.129 
IV.  GEIER’S LEGACY  
At the time, Geier embodied the result of more than a 
decade’s worth of case law concerning the preemption of 
common law product liability actions. The Geier holding 
combined the analysis of several leading cases into a single 
approach to examining preemption questions. The holding 
clarified the important question of how express preemption and 
saving clauses are to be interpreted together and provided a 
limited solution under which the needs of both the federal 
government and the states were met.130 Furthermore, contrary 
to the opinion of several commentators,131 the Geier decision did 
take into account the presumption against preemption. Lastly, 
the holding made clear the importance of agency opinions in 
determining the preemptive reach of complex federal 
regulations. 
A.  The Express Preemption Clause and the Saving Clause 
Among its other distinctions, the Geier decision will 
probably be most remembered for its reading of the express 
preemption clause in conjunction with the saving clause.132 
Specifically, the majority held that state actions can be 
preempted under “ordinary preemption principles” even where 
a Congressional act contains both an express preemption and a 
savings clause. 133  
  
 129 Id. at 881-82. Justice Breyer continued by saying that because this case 
dealt with conflict preemption, the dissent’s insistence upon a clear statement of 
preemptive intent was not required. Actual conflict preemption does not require the 
intent to preempt the state law, but rather a federal objective that would be hindered 
by the state action. Id. at 884-85. 
 130 See Bough & Johnson, supra note 54, at 34 (citing the attorneys for Alexis 
Geier as saying that the preemption holding was a very narrow one, and was a victory 
for consumers). 
 131 E.g., Raeker-Jordan, supra note 13, at 2 (arguing that Geier “removed any 
protections the presumption provided to federalism principles”); Davis, supra note 2, at 
971 (stating that Geier along with other recent court holdings has effectively erased the 
presumption against preemption, and instead created a presumption in favor of 
preemption). 
 132 See Geier, 529 U.S. at 869 (recognizing that when it had previously dealt 
with the same statute it had left open the question of how the saving clause affected 
the express preemption clause).  
 133 Id. at 867-69. The Geier holding has been criticized for not defining, 
“ordinary preemption principles.” See Raeker-Jordan, supra note 13, at 12. While such 
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This holding should be viewed as an extension of the 
Court’s relatively recent interpretations of express preemption 
clauses. In 1992, the Supreme Court decided in Cipollone v. 
Liggett Group, that the express preemption clause in the 
federal law dealing with labeling on cigarette packs preempted 
any claim for failure to warn about the dangers of cigarette 
smoking.134 In the Cipollone holding, Justice Stevens, writing 
for the plurality, advocated a narrow reading of any express 
preemption clause.135 Although Cipollone generated some doubt 
as to whether an express preemption clause prohibited an 
implied preemption analysis,136 Justice Thomas made clear in 
Freightliner Corp. v. Myrick137 that Cipollone did not hold that 
the existence of an express preemption clause categorically 
foreclosed an implied preemption analysis. 138  
Based on Cipollone, Justice Thomas’s conclusion in 
Freightliner is entirely logical. For example, suppose Congress 
had enacted an express preemption clause as part of the 
Agricultural Adjustment Act,139 and the clause was narrowly 
interpreted by a court not to preempt all common law actions.140 
  
a definition might have been useful from a completeness standpoint, the lack thereof 
should not be viewed as a fatal flaw in Justice Breyer’s reasoning. In stating that 
“ordinary preemption principles apply,” he was simply referring to the Court’s long 
history of preemption holdings, which have been previously summarized by several 
courts and did not necessarily need to be repeated. E.g., English v. Gen. Elec. Co., 496 
U.S. 71, 78-79 (1990) (describing the three circumstances under which Congress can be 
said to have preempted state law, express preemption, field preemption, and conflict 
preemption); La. Pub. Serv. Comm’n v. FCC, 476 U.S. 355, 368-369 (1986) (providing a 
brief synopsis of the preemption doctrine); Jones v. Rath Packing, 430 U.S. 519, 525-
526 (1976) (providing a summary of the presumption against preemption and the ways 
federal law can preempt state law). 
 134 Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 505 U.S. 504, 530-531 (1992) 
(summarizing the Court’s holding).  
 135 See id. at 529 (explaining how the express preemption clause should be 
“fairly but narrowly construed”). 
 136 See Freightliner Corp. v. Myrick, 514 U.S. 280, 287 (1995) (“According to 
respondents and the Court of Appeals, Cipollone v. Liggett Group, held that implied 
preemption cannot exist when Congress has chosen to include an express preemption 
clause in a statute.”). 
 137 Id. Like Geier, Freightliner also dealt with the National Traffic and Motor 
Vehicle Safety Act, however in that case, Justice Thomas chose to reach the holding 
without addressing the saving clause. See Geier, 529 U.S. at 869 (interpreting 
Freightliner as not addressing the saving clause). 
 138 Freightliner, 514 U.S. at 288-89. 
 139 7 U.S.C. § 602 (2000). 
 140  The plaintiff in Geier, as well as several commentators, have advocated 
this type of narrow reading of preemption clauses. See Brief for Petitioner at 18-25, 
Geier (arguing that the wording of the Safety Act’s express preemption clause shows 
that it does not preempt state common law actions, this position was rejected by the 
Court in its holding); Michael L. Russell, Beyond Geier: Federalism Faces an Uncertain 
Future, 11 SETON HALL CONST. L.J. 69, 83-85 (2000) (reviewing how many state 
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Pursuant to the Act, the Department of Agriculture 
promulgated a regulation stating that all avocados sold in 
interstate commerce must contain no more than 7% oil. 
However, suppose a California court, interpreting a California 
state regulation, declared that an avocado had to contain 
between 8% and 10% oil in order for it to be considered ripe. In 
this scenario, it would be impossible to obey both federal and 
state requirements.141 Therefore, in accordance with the 
Supremacy Clause, the Department of Agriculture’s regulation 
must be allowed to implicitly preempt the California 
regulation. Otherwise, no out-of-state avocados could be 
brought into California.142 This same concern applies to Justice 
Breyer’s interpretation of the saving clause. If the saving 
clause were interpreted to foreclose all preemption, then a 
situation could arise where the states, through common law, 
could achieve what they could not through positive 
enactments—the nullification of a federal act.143  
Thus, in deciding Geier, the Court preserved Congress’s 
power to regulate uniformly across the nation. In a situation 
such as Geier, if the District of Columbia, through common law, 
declared that a manufacturer was negligent for not installing 
airbags in cars made in 1984, that decision would have ripple 
effects throughout the nation.144 Due to the mobile nature of the 
  
supreme courts, before Geier, had held that the Safety Act’s dual express preemption 
and saving clauses acted to preserve almost all state common law actions); Carroll, 
supra note 14, at 820-823 (arguing that an express preemption clause, along with a 
saving clause and the presumption against preemption, should be interpreted together 
to indicate that Congress had not intended to preempt any state tort claims, and that 
the majority in Geier had held incorrectly). However, just such a narrow interpretation 
was what Justice Scalia was concerned about in his concurrence/dissent from the 
Cipollone holding. See Cipollone, 505 U.S. at 547-48 (Scalia, J. concurring in the 
judgment in part and dissenting in part). In addition to advocating a narrow reading of 
the express preemption clause, Justice Stevens in Cipollone had also declared that 
when an act contains an express preemption clause, no implied preemption analysis 
should be undertaken. Id. at 517. However, Justice Scalia rightly pointed out that 
these two holdings would produce a result whereby states could be allowed to impose 
regulations entirely contrary to the federal law. Id. at 547-548 (Scalia, J. concurring in 
the judgment in part and dissenting in part). 
 141 See English v. Gen. Elec. Co., 496 U.S. 72, 79 (1990) (asserting that in a 
situation where it is impossible to meet both the federal and state regulation, that 
implied preemption dictated that the state regulation could not stand). 
 142 Cf. Florida Lime & Avocado Growers, Inc. v. Paul, 373 U.S. 132, 142-143 
(1964) (giving a hypothetical similar to this one, however not considering the express 
preemption clause). 
 143 See Geier v. Am. Honda Motors Co., 529 U.S. 861, 870 (2000) (discussing 
the effects of the saving clause). 
 144 Cf. Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111, 127-28 (1942) (arguing, in relation to 
the Commerce Clause, that even a small individual farmer’s actions can have an effect 
on the national economy). 
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nation’s economy, in which cars can be bought and sold in 
many different states, such a holding would force all car 
manufacturers to meet the standards of the strictest state on a 
given issue.145 This rule would allow a small group of states, or 
even a single state, to frustrate congressional objectives of 
uniformity and potentially unilaterally establish the safety 
standards for the entire nation.146 By declaring that “ordinary 
preemption” principles still apply in the presence of a saving 
clause, the Court in Geier was trying to establish a functional 
standard that other courts could use, rather than a formalistic 
approach which would have truly represented a “seismic 
shift”147 in the preemption doctrine. 
While this holding may appear to be at odds with the 
presumption against preemption, the federalism arguments in 
favor of allowing implied preemption are similar to those used 
to justify the presumption against preemption.148 Although it is 
true, as commentators and Justices alike have agreed, that the 
presumption against preemption is in place to protect the 
federalist structure of our government,149 it should not be 
forgotten that the Framers of the Constitution also believed the 
federal government should, when appropriate, regulate the 
entire nation uniformly.150 Justice Stevens argued for the 
dissent in Geier that the presumption against preemption acts 
as a safeguard to maintain the federal-state balance.151 A true 
  
 145 See United States v. Locke, 529 U.S. 89, 113-116 (2000) (noting, in its 
preemption discussion, the out-of-state effects of four Washington State maritime laws, 
and holding that each law was preempted, in part, because of the laws out-of-state 
effects); Supreme Court 1999, Leading Cases, supra note 60, at 346-47.  
 146 Supreme Court 1999, Leading Cases, supra note 60, at 346-47; Geier, 529 
U.S. at 872 (arguing in favor of allowing ordinary preemption principles to apply by 
noting that if ordinary preemption principles did not apply, then Congress would have 
created a law, which by design would have been self-defeating). 
 147 Davis, supra note 2, at 1012 (“Geier represents a seismic shift in the 
Court's preemption doctrine.). 
 148 See discussion supra Part II.B (describing how the Articles of 
Confederation were too weak because they lacked an appropriate enforcement 
measure, and how the Framers believed that the Supremacy Clause would provide this 
enforcement mechanism). 
 149 Carroll, supra note 14, at 805-08 (discussing how the evolution of the 
presumption against preemption was an attempt by the court to regulate the federal 
structure and in the 1980’s was a response to growing federal power); Geier, 529 U.S. 
at 907 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (“Our presumption against preemption is rooted in the 
concept of federalism.”). 
 150 See discussion supra Part II.A. See also Supreme Court 1999, Leading 
Cases, supra note 58, at 347 (stating that the problem of different states present 
disparate regulatory schemes was among those that the Framers intended to prevent 
when they gave the federal government the power to regulate the nation uniformly). 
 151 Geier, 529 U.S. at 907-09 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (arguing that the 
presumption against preemption acts to ensure that Congress and not the Judiciary 
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balance, however, should require a quid pro quo between the 
federal and state governments: just as the federal government 
should not be allowed to usurp the state’s power,152 the Court 
should not be too quick to allow the states to usurp the federal 
government’s duly apportioned powers.153 Allowing all state 
common law actions to be preserved by the saving clause would 
be just as dangerous to the federal-state balance as ignoring 
the presumption against preemption and allowing the express 
preemption clause to trump all state common law actions.154  
In keeping with this need for balance, Justice Breyer’s 
reading of the express preemption clause in light of the saving 
clause should not be seen as a one-sided ruling in favor of the 
powers of the federal government.155 This interpretation may 
appear to create some “tension”156 between the “polar magnetic 
field[s]” of the express preemption clause and the saving 
clause.157 Justice Stevens in Cipollone158 stated that a conjoined 
  
strikes the appropriate federal-state balance). Justice Stevens wrote that it is the 
structural safeguards “inherent in the normal operation of the legislative process” that 
will guarantee that the balance is maintained between the power of the federal 
government and that of the state. Id. at 907. 
 152 See Hillsborough County, Fla. v. Automated Med. Labs., Inc. 471 U.S. 707, 
707 (1985) (stating that to assume all state regulations are preempted simply because 
a federal agency has produced a complex set of regulations in a given area would be 
“inconsistent with the federal-state balance” the court has strived to maintain in its 
Supremacy Clause decisions). 
 153 It is interesting to note that four of the five justices who voted in the 
majority in Geier have in the past two decades been the most active champions of 
“states rights.” Those justices are Chief Justice Rehnquist, Justice O’Connor, Justice 
Scalia, and Justice Kennedy. See Russell, supra note 142, at 89 (2000) (speculating as 
to reasons why Justices O’Connor and Scalia, traditionally conservative “states rights” 
justices, voted in the majority). See also Herman Schwartz, The States’ Rights Assault 
on Federal Authority, in THE REHNQUIST COURT: JUDICIAL ACTIVISM ON THE RIGHT 155, 
155-67 (Herman Schwartz ed., 2002) (arguing that these four justices, along with 
Justice Thomas, have combined to form a solid conservative majority that strongly 
favors states rights). 
 154 See United States v. Bass, 404 U.S. 336, 349 (1971) (holding that, as a rule 
of statutory interpretation, Congressional intent must be clear before a court can hold 
that Congress has “significantly changed the federal-state balance”). 
 155 See Geier, 529 U.S. at 871 (discussing how Congress had inserted the 
saving clause in order to indicate that it still intended to allow for the compensation of 
victims). 
 156 Silkwood v. Kerr-McGee Corp., 464 U.S. 238, 256 (1984) (discussing 
Congress’s occupation of the field of nuclear energy and its desire to maintain common 
law liability). 
 157 M. Stuart Madden, Federal Preemption of Inconsistent State Safety 
Obligations, 21 PACE L. REV. 103, 158 (2000) (lamenting what he perceived to be the 
Court’s failure to reconcile Cipollone’s favoring of the express preemption clause and 
Geier’s favoring of the saving clause). 
 158 This argument is based on a statement the Court made in Cipollone v. 
Liggett Group Inc., 505 U.S. 504, 517 (1992). Justice Stevens, writing for the Court in 
Cipollone, held that congressional enactment of an express preemption prevision 
precludes further preemption analysis. Id. Justice Stevens based this opinion on the 
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reading of the express and implied preemption clause, as found 
in Geier, violated the interpretive maxim of expressio unius est 
exclusio alterius. 159 However, the Court pointed out in Geier, as 
well as in Silkwood v. Kerr-McGee Corp.,160 that this 
interpretive tension is a reflection of a “congressional 
compromise”161 between tort law’s traditional compensatory role 
in our system and the Federal government’s need to establish 
uniform standards.162  
Under the Geier opinion, Congress and the DOT’s strong 
desire to aid interstate commerce by creating uniform 
standards163 is recognized in the express preemption of all 
  
“familiar principle of expressio unius est exclusio alterius,” that Congress’s enactment of 
a preemption provision foreclosed preemption being found (or not found) on a different 
basis. Id. However, this position was later interpreted and modified by the Court in 
Freightliner Corp. v. Myrick, 514 U.S. 280, 288-89 (1995). In Freightliner, Justice 
Thomas held that, at most, a Court could infer from an express preemption clause that 
Congress did not intend to preempt beyond the stated express preemptive reach. Id. at 
288. As a result, he held that preemption was not explicitly foreclosed for those issues 
beyond the express preemption clause’s scope. Id. This interpretation laid the basis for 
Justice Breyer’s declaration that the express preemption clause must be read in light of 
the saving clause. Geier, 529 U.S. at 869, 872. In addition to the basis created by 
Freightliner, Justice Breyer’s interpretation was also consistent with Cipollone in that 
he was not stating that the further preemptive scope provided by implied preemption 
was in addition to the express preemption. Id. at 870-71. Instead, he was holding that 
the saving clause, by preserving common law actions, had created an additional need to 
examine implied preemption to ensure that common law actions did not defeat the 
congressional objectives for the act. Id. at 871-72. 
 159 BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 602 (7th ed. 1999) (“A canon of construction 
holding that to express or include one thing implies the exclusion of the other, or of the 
alternative.”). 
 160 See Silkwood, 464 U.S. at 256 (stating that the Court recognized that some 
tension existed between Congress’s occupation of the field of nuclear energy, and the 
Court’s interpretation that common law liability still exists, but explaining that the 
Court could not have held any other way because the tension was created by Congress, 
and may have been intended as off-setting factors to maintain some local 
accountability for nuclear plants). 
 161 See Geier, 529 U.S. at 871 (observing that the Court recognized that two 
policies existed, national uniformity and victim compensation, but that it could find 
“nothing in any natural reading of the two” that would indicate a preference of one 
policy over the other). See also Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae 
Supporting Affirmance at 15, Geier (dismissing any tension within the Safety Act as 
being a product of Congress’s intentional compromise between the “interests in 
uniformity and [the need to allow] States to compensate accident victims” as 
represented in the inclusion of both an express preemption and a saving clause). 
 162 Geier, 529 U.S. at 870-71 (interpreting the language in the express 
preemption and saving clauses to be a neutral reflection of Congress’s dual goals of 
national uniformity and victim compensation). See also Rogers v. Cosco, Inc., 737 
N.E.2d 1158, 1165 (Ind. App. Ct. 2000) (interpreting the Safety Act’s having both a 
preemption and a saving clause as a “congressional compromise” between a national 
interest in uniformity and a local interest in compensating accident victims based upon 
common law tort standards). 
 163 Geier, 529 U.S. at 871 (“[T]he preemption provision itself reflects a desire 
to subject the industry to a single, uniform set of federal safety standards.”). 
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positive state legislative enactment.164 At the same time, the 
Geier holding preserves the important role the states play in 
compensating victims so long as this compensation system does 
not obstruct Congress’s objectives for the federal regulation.165 
While the tension created by this holding makes it impossible 
to create a single bright-line-rule,166 it strikes the appropriate 
balance between Congress’s desire to enact uniform legislation 
and the states’ need to compensate victims. 
B.  Geier and the Presumption Against Preemption 
As has been alluded to above, Geier did not “eradicate 
the presumption against preemption.”167 Instead, the Court 
found that an appropriate examination of the traditional 
preemption factors showed that the regulation in question 
overcame the presumption.168 The presumption has never been 
interpreted to mean that the federal government should never 
preempt state law.169 Rather, it is important that the Court 
should not inhibit Congress’s attempts to regulate an 
industry.170  
  
 164 Id. 
 165 Id. (stating that “occasional nonuniformity is a small price to pay for a 
system” that allows juries to establish standards and thereby compensate victims); 
Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Affirmance at 15, Geier 
(arguing that so long as implied preemption is preserved there is no reason to think 
that “tort liability will impair the purpose of the [Safety] Act”). 
 166 See Russell, supra note 142, at 91 (stating with dismay that “[t]he Court 
passed on an . . . opportunity to clarify the law of federal pre-emption,” and ended up 
just raising more questions); Carroll, supra note 13, at 800 (expressing a concern that 
the preemption doctrine after Cipollone, including Geier, has been “vague and 
overlapping,” and has created a situation where lower courts have had a very hard 
time consistently applying the rules). 
 167 Raeker-Jordan, supra note 12, at 1 (quoting from the title of the article). 
 168 Geier, 529 U.S. at 885 (“While we certainly accept the dissent’s basic 
position that a court should not find pre-emption too readily in the absence of clear 
evidence of a conflict, for the reasons set out above we find such evidence here.”) 
(internal citations omitted). Contra Geier, 529 U.S. at 906-907 (Stevens, J., dissenting) 
(arguing that the majority simply ignored the presumption against preemption). 
 169 See CSX Transp. v. Easterwood, 507 U.S. 658, 664 (1993) (“[A] court 
interpreting a federal statute pertaining to a subject traditionally governed by state 
law will be reluctant to find preemption.”) (emphasis added). Contra Raeker-Jordan, 
supra note 12, at 31 (arguing that the presumption against preemption forces the 
Court in deciding Geier to assume that Congress did not see any conflict between 
federal and state law, and therefore the presumption mandates the Court not to find a 
conflict). 
 170 Supreme Court 1999 Term, Leading Cases, supra note 60, at 347.  
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Justice Stevens and several commentators171 have 
criticized the Court’s narrow application of the presumption 
because it granted too much power to the federal government 
to govern an issue that the states had traditionally occupied.172 
Justice Stevens even went so far as to imply that the majority 
had ignored the presumption against preemption entirely.173 
Most of these critics would have preferred that physical 
impossibility conflict preemption be the only form of implied 
conflict preemption.174 However, if the Court had taken such a 
narrow approach to implied preemption it would have overly 
limited Congress’s constitutional powers.175 Since early in the 
presumption’s history, it has been clear that implied and 
obstacle preemption both provide sufficient justification for 
overcoming the presumption.176 If the Court insisted on physical 
  
 171 Geier, 529 U.S. at 907-08 (Stevens, J., dissenting). See also id. at 885 
(Breyer, J., majority) (interpreting the dissent’s position as stating that in “frustration-
of-purpos[e]” cases where the agency does not declare its preemptive intent, the dissent 
would prefer the state action be clearly an obstacle to the congressional purpose than 
have the state action be preempted); Nelson, supra note 2, at 231-32 (“Under the 
Supremacy Clause, preemption occurs if and only if state law contradicts a valid rule 
established by federal law. . . .”), Betsy J. Grey, Make Congress Speak Clearly: Federal 
Preemption of State Tort Remedies, 77 B.U. L. REV. 559, 622-27 (1997) (proposing that 
only situations where state law and federal law can not both be satisfied, are the only 
situations where preemption should occur). But see Geier, 529 U.S. at 908 n.22 
(Stevens, J., dissenting) (responding to Professor Nelson’s proposition by saying that 
the presumption protects against an over reaching federal judiciary, and dismissing 
Nelson’s request to limit all of preemption). 
 172 See Russell, supra note 142, at 91 (arguing that there was an ambiguity as 
to Congress’s preemptive intent in the Safety Act and that the presumption against 
preemption would dictate that there was no preemption, ultimately concluding that the 
presumption may no longer exist); Davis, supra note 2, at 1012-1013 (proposing that 
Geier represents a “seismic shift” in the Court’s interpretation of preemption cases, 
that the Court has re-written the presumption, and in fact created an assumption in 
favor of preemption). 
 173 Geier, 529 U.S. at 907-08 (Stevens, J., dissenting).  
 174 Carroll, supra note 13, at 820-822 (stating that “physical impossibility” 
should functionally be the only form of preemption the court recognizes absent a clear 
statement by Congress as to their preemptive intent); Davis, supra note 2, at 1014 
(asserting that in a “perfect world of preemption doctrine” implied preemption would 
only be based on occupation of the field and physical impossibility conflict). 
 175 Even Justice Stevens, writing for the dissent in Geier, argued that it 
should be Congress’s role to maintain the proper federal-state balance. Geier, 529 U.S. 
at 907 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (“The signal virtues of this presumption [against 
preemption] are its placement of the power of pre-emption squarely in the hands of 
Congress, which is far more suited than the Judiciary to strike the appropriate 
state/federal balance . . . .”). If that were the case, then limiting implied conflict 
preemption only to physical impossibility conflict preemption would constrain 
Congress’s ability to regulate that balance.  
 176 Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947) (saying after its 
famous interpretation of the presumption, that Congress’s “clear and manifest 
purpose” could be “evidenced in several ways,” including that “the object sought to be 
obtained by the federal law and the character of obligations imposed by it may reveal 
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impossibility before declaring implied preemption, then 
Congress would never be able to mandate anything more than 
minimum standards.177 A “physical impossibility only” rule like 
the one proposed would create a “one-way ratchet” that would 
limit the federal government’s effectiveness178 Congress could 
establish one standard, and then any state could establish 
overlapping stricter standards that merely make it physically 
possible to comply with both the federal and state laws.179 Such 
a ruling could in effect eviscerate the purpose behind any 
federal law.180 Unless Congress went out of its way to detail the 
entire possible preemptive scope of every law and regulation,181 
Congress would never be able to “expand industry discretion or 
to lower tort standards.”182  
In Geier, there were numerous indications of the DOT’s 
intent behind FMVSS 208, and it was clear that if the Court 
allowed Geier’s claim to continue, it would have greatly 
interfered with the DOT’s objectives.183 This is why the Court 
found substantial weight to overcome the presumption against 
preemption, and did not, as suggested, ignore the presumption 
altogether.184 In Geier, the Court was interpreting a regulation 
passed by an agency under the authority granted it by 
Congress.185 By combining the DOT’s long-held explanation of 
  
the same purpose . . . . Or the state policy may produce a result inconsistent with the 
objective of the federal statute”).  
 177 Geier, 529 U.S. at 908 n.22 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (refuting 
commentator’s calls for the elimination of all frustration-of-purpose preemption, by 
arguing that the presumption against preemption can eliminate the dangers of judicial 
overreaching). 
 178 Supreme Court 1999, Leading Cases, supra note 60, at 344. 
 179 Id. 
 180 Id. (declaring that a pure physical impossibility conflict preemption only 
doctrine would be “intractable” as a functional solution because it would “allow state 
courts to frustrate congressional will by setting countervailing tort standards”). 
 181 See Geier, 529 U.S. at 884 (rejecting the dissent’s proposal that the Court 
require an “agency statement of preemptive intent as a prerequisite to” finding conflict 
preemption). Justice Breyer pointed out that, unlike express preemption conflict 
preemption, physical impossibility preemption turns on the existence of an actual 
conflict that would inhibit the federal law. Id. He continued by stating that it is safe to 
assume that the federal government would not take the time to write a law or 
regulation only to have it superceded by state law. Id. at 885. 
 182 Supreme Court 1999, Leading Cases, supra note 60,at 344. 
 183 Geier, 529 U.S. at 877-82 (stating the reasons provided by the DOT for 
implementing FMVSS 208). 
 184 Id. at 883 (asserting that the majority was not placing the burden on the 
plaintiffs to show there was not preemption, but rather holding that the DOT’s 
arguments in favor of conflict were more persuasive than Geier’s arguments against 
preemption). 
 185 Id. (noting that Congress had delegated to the DOT the needed authority 
to implement the Safety Act). 
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the purposes behind FMVSS 208 and the history of the Act as 
interpreted in prior Supreme Court cases the Court was able to 
accurately determine Department’s intentions for FMVSS 
208.186 The Court made clear that the DOT interpreted the 
regulation’s objective to be the gradual phase-in of multiple 
passive restraint devices.187 This determination was not a 
formulaic, statutory approach to discerning the department’s 
intent,188 but rather a functional approach that took into 
account the real-life factors the Department was evaluating.189 
This method of analysis provides lower court judges enough 
flexibility to interpret a statute’s preemptive effect in a 
pragmatic manner while curtailing their ability to stray from 
the intention of the rule maker.  
C.  The Opinion of the Department of Transportation 
One of Geier’s final clarifications of the preemption 
doctrine is Justice Breyer’s deference to the opinion of the DOT 
throughout the holding.190 In fact, the Court’s ultimate holding 
that Geier’s claim was implicitly preempted was not the 
position advocated by either Geier191 or Honda192 in their briefs 
to the Court. Instead, Justice Breyer’s written decision followed 
the line of reasoning advocated by the Solicitor General on 
behalf of the DOT.193 This use of a federal agency to inform the 
  
 186 Id. at 878-880. 
 187 Id. at 879. 
 188 In dissent, Justice Stevens argued that even when implied preemption is 
the issue, all regulations must declare their preemptive intent with some specificity. 
Geier, 529 U.S. at 908 (Stevens, J., dissenting). In response, Justice Breyer rightly 
pointed out that to require such a statement in conflict preemption situations would 
simply be too rigid an approach, and would lead to a nullification of the regulation 
which the “agency, and therefore Congress, is most unlikely to have intended.” Id. at 
885. 
 189 See Supreme Court 1999, Leading Cases, supra note 60, at 343 (“The 
Court’s implied preemption analysis in Geier reflects a victory of function over form.”). 
This more functional approach is also in line with prior cases’ approaches to the 
interpretation of Congress’s intent. In Jones v. Rath Packing, Justice Thurgood 
Marshall declared that an inquiry into Congress’s intent must take into account “the 
relationship between state and federal laws as they are interpreted and applied, not 
merely as they are written.” 430 U.S. 519, 526 (1976).  
 190 Geier, 529 U.S. at 883-884 (explaining why the majority was relying on the 
opinion of the DOT).  
 191 See discussion supra note 98 (discussing the argument Geier presented in 
her brief). 
 192 See discussion supra note 86 (discussing the argument Honda presented in 
its brief).  
 193 See discussion supra note 103 (discussing the argument the Solicitor 
General presented in its brief on behalf of the DOT). See also Bough & Johnson, supra 
note 56, at 34 (noting that Justice Breyer in Geier “adopted almost verbatim” the 
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Court is both appropriate and beneficial to future courts 
dealing with complex federal regulations preempting state 
actions.194  
Justice Breyer’s conclusions about the role the DOT 
should play in the preemption analysis are in line with the 
Supreme Court’s holding in several previous cases. As far back 
as Bowles v. Seminole Rock & Sand Co.195 in 1945, the Court 
has held that an administrative interpretation of a regulation 
is controlling unless it is “plainly erroneous or inconsistent 
with the regulation.”196 In addition, so long as an agency is 
acting within its congressionally-delegated power, that agency 
may independently preempt a state action.197 Thus, in City of 
New York v. F.C.C.,198 the Court combined its previous holdings 
and made clear that both the intent of Congress and the intent 
of the agency should be considered when determining the 
preemptive reach of a regulation.199 More recently, in Medtronic, 
Inc. v. Lohr,200 the Court examined whether the Food and Drug 
Administration’s (FDA) approval of a medical device preempted 
a state action for negligence and strict liability.201 In Medtronic, 
  
opinion of the Solicitor General). Bough & Johnson argued that the majority’s adoption 
of the Solicitor General’s opinion in fact helped to limit the scope of the preemption 
holding. Id. They noted that the Solicitor General and the Court both left open the door 
for suits against manufacturers for specific defects in the design of the restraints; a 
door that may not have been open had the Court found express preemption. Id.  
 194 See Geier, 529 U.S. at 883 (commenting on the complex nature of the issues 
surrounding FMVSS 208 and asserting that the agency is “likely to have a thorough 
understanding of its own regulation”).  
 195 325 U.S. 410 (1945) (dealing with an interpretation of the General 
Maximum Price Regulation by the Office of Price Administration, the Court held that 
when considering an administrative regulation the ultimate criterion should be the 
administrative interpretation).  
 196 Id. at 414. 
 197 La. Pub. Serv. Comm’n v. F.C.C., 476 U.S. 355, 369 (1986) (describing how 
the F.C.C. could preempt state depreciation charges, though ultimately holding that 
the F.C.C. lacked the jurisdiction to do so). 
 198 486 U.S. 57 (1988) (holding that the F.C.C. clearly had intended to displace 
all technical standards governing the quality of cable TV signals, and that such a 
decision was within the agency’s congressionally delegated authority). 
 199 Id. at 64. In City of New York, the Court first drew upon precedent to make 
clear that a regulation created by a federal agency, acting within its appropriately 
delegated authority, will have just as much preemptive force as a law passed by 
Congress. Id. Next, the Court stated that in such situations a narrow focus on just the 
preemptive intent of Congress would be misdirected. Id. Rather that focus should be 
placed on the powers and intent of the agency to which the authority was delegated. Id.  
 200 518 U.S. 470, 495-496 (1996). 
 201 Id. at 474. The issue was over a grandfather clause under which certain 
medical devices could be approved by the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) without 
having to undergo the rigorous pre-market approval process. Id. at 477. The Medical 
Device Amendments of 1976 (MDA) allowed certain medical devices that were 
“substantially similar” to those in existence before 1976 to be approved without 
 
 2/28/2005 2:15:30 PM 
2005] NOT AS BAD AS WE THOUGHT 979 
as in Geier, the primary question was not whether the federal 
statute had preempted the state action, but rather whether the 
FDA requirements for approval preempted the action.202 By 
determining that the FDA was in a unique position because it 
had originally promulgated the regulation; the Court in 
MedTronic gave “substantial weight to the agency’s view of the 
statute.”203 Ultimately, the Supreme Court agreed with the 
conclusion reached by the FDA, holding that its approval 
requirements do not preempt state action. 
In light of this history, it is not surprising that Justice 
Breyer would defer to the opinion advocated by the DOT in 
Geier. If Congress’s intent is the “touchstone” of any 
preemption analysis of a congressional statute,204 then the 
position of an agency should hold the same position in the 
preemption analysis of a regulation. Unlike Congress, however, 
an agency is normally required to speak in a single voice as to 
the reasons underlying its regulations205 and can even file briefs 
as amicus curiae to the Court expressing its opinion about the 
regulation.206 The agency’s single voice means that its 
preemptive intent is normally much simpler to discern. It is 
important to note that in both Medtronic and Geier (and as will 
be seen later in Sprietsma v. Mercury Marine207) the agency 
opinion the Court referred to was not one that the agency had 
adopted in preparation for litigation, but rather one that had 
been either part of the original regulations as they were 
promulgated,208 or were a long expressed opinion of the 
agency.209 This distinction is important; it provides a level of 
  
undergoing the approval process. Id. at 477-478. The question before the Supreme 
Court was whether a state action for negligent design was preempted by the MDA 
when the device in question had not undergone the pre-market approval process. Id. at 
478. 
 202 Id. at 496. 
 203 Id. 
 204 Retail Clerks v. Schermerhorn, 375 U.S. 96, 103 (1963). 
 205 See, e.g., Medtronic v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470, 496 (1996) (referring to the FDA 
regulations implementing the process to request an advisory opinion from the FDA 
about whether a state requirement is preempted by the statute).  
 206 See, e.g., Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting 
Affirmance at 15-30, Geier (explaining the DOT’s opinion that FMVSS 208 implicitly 
preempted Geier’s claim).  
 207 See discussion infra Part V.B. 
 208 See Medtronic, 518 U.S. at 496-497.  
 209 See Geier v. Am. Honda Motors Co., 529 U.S. 861, 883-884 (2000) (noting 
that the opinion of the DOT was one they had advocated “consistently over time”). In 
fact, Justice Breyer, made a point to note that the Court had no reason to suspect the 
DOT’s position to be anything other than its “‘fair and considered judgment on the 
matter.’” Id. at 884 (quoting Auer v. Robbins, 519 U.S. 452, 461-462 (1997)). He also 
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reliability to the agency’s opinion.210 This combination of 
efficiency and reliability in the use of agency opinions should 
and has guided courts in their preemption holdings.211 
V.  PRODUCT LIABILITY PREEMPTION SINCE GEIER 
As a statement of recent Supreme Court thinking on 
preemption, Geier has been referenced as a model for how to 
approach a preemption case, especially cases involving both an 
express preemption clause and a saving clause. Except for 
areas where lower courts have interpreted a federal regulation 
as offering the defendant a choice, most of these courts have 
approvingly cited Geier’s interpretation of the express 
preemption and saving clause, but have shown restraint in 
following Geier in preempting state law actions.212 Several of 
these cases have preserved the presumption against 
preemption by distinguishing those statutes that offer 
defendants a choice and those that represent a minimum 
standard.213 The Supreme Court in Sprietsma v. Mercury 
Marine recently supported many of the lower courts’ 
interpretations that Geier did not indicate a shift to more 
preemption, but rather showed a flexible approach to the 
complex problem of interpreting an express preemption and 
saving clause together.214  
  
distinguished the Court’s opinion in Hillsborough County v. Automated Med. Lab., Inc. 
where the F.C.C. had not, at any time, concluded that a conflict existed between the 
federal and state regulations. Id. (citing Hillsborough County v. Automated Med. Lab., 
Inc., 471 U.S. 707, 721 (1985)).  
 210 See id.  
 211 See Oxygenated Fuels Assoc. Inc. v. Davis, 331 F.3d 665, 672 (9th Cir. 
2003) (distinguishing Geier on the grounds that the Supreme Court’s opinion was 
consistent with that of the DOT, whereas in Oxygenated Fuels the EPA had not 
expressed an opinion concerning preemption, and therefore any comparison between 
the two cases must be viewed in that light).  
 212 See, e.g., Colon v. BIC USA Inc., 136 F. Supp. 2d 196 (S.D.N.Y. 2000) 
(interpreting the Consumer Product Safety Act’s express preemption and saving 
clauses to allow implied preemption, but ultimately holding that the plaintiff’s action 
was not preempted).  
 213 See, e.g., Stone v. Frontier Airlines, Inc., 256 F. Supp. 2d 28 (D. Mass. 
2002) (drawing a distinction between regulations that offered a choice and those simply 
requiring an action be taken, holding that the regulation in question fell into the latter 
category and therefore did not preempt the state action). 
 214 See Sprietsma v. Mercury Marine, 729 N.E.2d 45, 49-50, 63 (2002) (finding 
that the Federal Boat Safety Act’s express preemption and saving clauses should be 
read together to allow implied preemption, but ultimately holding that the Coast 
Guard’s decision not to regulate propeller guards did not preempt a state action which 
required propeller guards). 
 2/28/2005 2:15:30 PM 
2005] NOT AS BAD AS WE THOUGHT 981 
A. Geier’s Influence Interpreting Express Preemption and 
Saving Clauses  
Justice Breyer’s interpretation of the saving and express 
preemption clauses has clearly been the most recognized 
holding to result from the Geier decision.215 Nevertheless, 
contrary to the opinion expressed by several commentators,216 
the decision has not lead to a vast number of courts using 
implied preemption to expand federal powers and usurp state’s 
actions.217 In fact, several circuits have overruled pre-Geier 
district court rulings of express preemption and reinstated 
previously preempted cases.218 These holdings have shown that 
Justice Breyer’s interpretation of the preemption and saving 
clauses has had the result that he had anticipated—it has 
preserved what he saw as Congress’s intent to encourage 
  
 215 The Supreme Court has referenced Geier for this point at least two times 
since the case was handed down. First, in 2001 Chief Justice Rehnquist referenced 
Geier for the idea that neither an express preemption nor a saving clause will bar the 
ordinary working of preemption. Buckman Co. v. Plaintiffs’ Legal Comm., 531 U.S. 341, 
352 (2001). In late 2002, Justice Stevens expressly referred to Geier in his 
interpretation of Federal Boating Safety Act’s express preemption and saving clauses. 
Sprietsma, 537 U.S. at 52. Additionally, lower courts have referenced Geier for this 
point in numerous diverse cases. See, e.g., Russell v. Sprint Corp., 264 F. Supp. 2d 955, 
961 (D. Kan. 2003) (holding that because of its saving clause, the Federal 
Communications Act does not preempt all state and local regulations regarding market 
entry, or rate changes by a cell phone service company); Secured Envtl. Mgmt., Inc. v. 
Tex. Natural Res. Conservation Comm’n, 97 S.W.3d 246 (Tex. Ct. App. 2002) 
(referencing Geier in declaring that because of the Federal Resource Conservation and 
Recovery Act’s saving clause, a particular state’s hazardous waste statute is only 
preempted if it conflicts with the goals of the federal act). 
 216 See e.g., Alexander K. Haas, Casenote, Chipping Away at State Tort 
Remedies Through Pre-emption Jurisprudence: Geier v. American Honda Motor Co., 89 
CAL. L. REV. 1927 (2001) (declaring that Geier strengthens the power of the federal 
government to preempt state laws, and implying that the holding will lead to fewer 
individuals being able to sue); Davis, supra note 2, at 1015 (declaring that the Supreme 
Court’s preemption doctrine provides a preference for preemption that would lead to 
more preemption); Jack B. Weinstein, The Restatement of Torts and the Courts, 54 
VAND. L. REV. 1439, 1442 (2001) (stating that the modern preemption doctrine makes 
him nervous for the “bottom-up” protection of jury-decided cases).  
 217 See Bough & Johnson, supra note 56, at 34 (noting that the attorneys for 
Alexis Geier believed that the holding was a victory for plaintiffs and consumers 
because it flat out rejected Honda’s express preemption argument, and narrowly 
construed implied preemption based on choice). 
 218 See, e.g., Leipart v. Guardian Indus., Inc., 234 F.3d 1063 (9th Cir. 2000) 
(using Geier’s interpretation of the Safety Act’s preemption and saving clauses as an 
analogy, the Circuit Court overruled a pre-Geier district court holding which said that 
the Consumer Product Safety Act preempted a plaintiff’s common law product liability 
and tort claims); Choate v. Champion Home Builders, 222 F.3d 788, 793 (10th Cir. 
2000) (following the Supreme Court’s holding in Geier to declare that the plaintiff’s 
claims were neither expressly or implicitly preempted by the Manufactured Housing 
Act). 
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uniform standards across the country while preserving the 
“necessary compensation to victims.”219  
The effect of Justice Breyer’s interpretation is 
fundamental to any preemption decision involving similar 
preemption clauses. Several lower courts, when interpreting 
similar clauses, have first declared that the express preemption 
and saving clauses preserve the “ordinary working” of the 
preemption doctrine,220 and then have examined whether the 
federal law or regulation conflicts with the state action.221 Just a 
few months after the Supreme Court handed down Geier, the 
Tenth Circuit decided Choate v. Champion Home Builders.222 In 
Choate, the manufacturers of a home were defending against a 
product liability action for not installing a battery powered 
back up smoke detector in the plaintiff’s home.223 Before the 
Geier decision had been released, the District Court in Choate 
held that the National Manufactured Housing Construction 
and Safety Standards Act of 1974 (Housing Construction Act) 
expressly and implicitly preempted the plaintiff’s suit.224 
Following Geier, the Tenth Circuit reversed the District Court, 
holding that the Housing Construction Act could implicitly 
preempt a common law suit even though there was no express 
preemption.225  
The Tenth Circuit next examined whether the plaintiff’s 
claims would conflict with the objectives of the Housing 
Construction Act and thereby be implicitly preempted.226 The 
Circuit looked at the language of the act, stating that Congress 
had made clear that its objective was to supervise the 
manufactured housing industry.227 Additionally, the Circuit 
  
 219 Geier v. Am. Honda Motors Co., 529 U.S. 861, 871 (2000) (stating that one 
reason for his allowing implied preemption to persist was Congress’s dual goals of 
uniformity and victim compensation). 
 220 See id. at 869. 
 221 See, e.g., Choate, 222 F.3d at 793 (discussing the effects the Manufactured 
Housing Act’s saving clause had on the act’s express preemption clause, referring 
approvingly to Geier’s interpretation of similar clauses); Stone v. Frontier Airlines Inc., 
256 F. Supp. 2d 28, 40 (D. Mass. 2002) (citing both Geier and Sprietsma for the 
proposition that a saving clause and an express preemption clause should be read to 
allow some cases to not be preempted).  
 222 222 F.3d at 788. Choate was decided in July of 2000, and Geier was decided 
in May of 2000.  
 223 Id. at 790.  
 224 Id. The lower court decision is unpublished. 
 225 Id. at 792-94. (finding that the language for the express and saving clauses 
in the Manufactured Housing Construction Act was similar to the language at issue in 
Geier). 
 226 Id. at 794.  
 227 Choate, 222 F.3d at 795. 
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Court held that the language of the regulation in question 
established a minimum standard.228 The Circuit Court 
distinguished the holding in Geier on the grounds that FMVSS 
208 gave the auto manufacturers a choice whereas the 
regulation at issue in Choate set a minimum safety standard 
for all housing construction.229 The Tenth Circuit’s decision 
demonstrates how the Geier preemption analysis is a highly 
functional approach, but does not demand the outcome of 
preemption in every case.230  
Choate stands as an example of how a number of cases 
have applied Geier without finding implied preemption.231 In 
Colon ex rel. Molina v. BIC USA Inc.,232 the defendants relied 
heavily on Cipollone in arguing that the express preemption 
clause of the Consumer Product Safety Act (CPSA) preempted 
the plaintiff’s common law product liability action.233 The 
Southern District of New York, however, declared that because 
the CPSA contained a saving clause, Geier and not Cipollone 
should control.234 The Southern District also held that the 
CPSA’s regulations concerning disposable butane lighters 
  
 228 Id. The circuit court held that the federal regulation was a minimum 
standard because the regulation simply required that a house have a hardwired smoke 
detector installed. Id. The regulation did not provide alternatives (e.g. a hardwired 
smoke detector or a battery operated smoke detector) and it did not require that 
hardwiring be the only form of power to the smoke detector. Id. Therefore, since the 
federal law, and the proposed state requirement of a battery back up for a hardwired 
smoke detector were not mutually exclusive, and since the federal regulation did not 
prohibit additional regulation of smoke detectors, the Tenth Circuit held that the 
federal regulation was a minimum standard. Id. See also Geier v. Am. Honda Motors 
Co., 529 U.S. 861, 870 (2000) (stating that the express preemption clause read in light 
of the saving clause “preserves those actions that seek to establish greater safety than 
the minimum safety achieved by a federal regulation intended to provide a floor”). 
 229 Choate, 222 F.3d at 796.  
 230 See Bough & Johnson, supra note 56, at 33 (arguing that Geier does not 
mandate preemption in every situation, citing Choate as an example, where the same 
analysis as Geier was used, but where no preemption was found, because the state 
common law action in question could be seen to improve or support the federal 
objectives). 
 231 So far, however, most courts have held that Geier’s interpretation is most 
applicable to express preemption and saving clauses that are similarly worded to those 
in the Safety Act. See, e.g., Dow Agrosciences LLC v. Bates, 332 F.3d 323 (5th Cir. 
2003) (holding that the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide and Rodenticide Act’s “savings 
clause,” which only preserves a state’s regulating authority over federally registered 
pesticides, and does not mention common law actions, does not alter the Act’s express 
preemption clause’s preemption of a common law failure to warn action). 
 232 136 F. Supp. 2d 196 (S.D.N.Y. 2000). 
 233 Id. at 203.  
 234 Id. at 204 & n.7 (stating that “unlike the CPSA, the Public Health and 
Cigarette Safety Act [the act at issue in Cipollone] does not contain a saving clause[;]” 
also noting that all the cases cited by the defense were decided before Geier, and so did 
not take that holding into account).  
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established a minimum standard.235 Consequently, in 
accordance with Geier, the court held that the regulations did 
not implicitly preempt the plaintiff’s action.236 The Ninth Circuit 
also came to the same conclusion when it examined the CPSA 
in Leipart v. Guardian Industries, Inc.237 
In addition to Geier’s influence on the court’s 
interpretation of the CPSA, the District of Massachusetts held 
in Stone v. Frontier Airlines, Inc.,238 that in accordance with the 
Supreme Court’s holdings in Geier and in Sprietsma, the 
Airline Deregulation Act’s saving clause should be read to 
preserve some measure of airline related common law actions.239 
The court held that Massachusetts’ interest in preserving the 
health and safety of its citizens through tort law remedies 
overrode the federal interest in uniformity.240 
B. Choice Versus Minimum Standards and the 
Presumption Against Preemption 
Although Geier may have had an important effect on 
how lower courts interpret express preemption clauses,241 lower 
courts have not taken the decision as carte blanche to “[run] 
amok with our potentially boundless . . . doctrine of implied 
conflict pre-emption . . . .”242 In what could be referred to as a 
triumph of the presumption against preemption, many courts 
have applied Justice Breyer’s approach in Geier without finding 
the state action to have been impliedly preempted.243 Those 
  
 235 Id. at 207 (“The CPSC regulations establish general, rudimentary and 
minimal requirements . . . [that] do not specify design alternatives or production 
methods from which manufacturers may choose . . . .”). This interpretation as a 
minimum requirement due to the lack of alternatives was cited by the court as a major 
distinction between Colon and Geier. Id. at n. 14.  
 236 Id. at 207-209 (holding that the plaintiff’s claims would not obstruct 
Congress’s objectives for the CPSC and would in fact be consistent with those 
objectives). 
 237 234 F.3d 1063 (9th Cir. 2000) (holding that in light of the Court’s decision 
in Geier, the CPSA did not expressly or implicitly preempt the plaintiff’s action, 
because the saving clause preserved some common law actions, and the CPSA’s 
regulations represented minimum standards as opposed to the choices represented in 
Geier). 
 238 256 F. Supp. 2d 28 (D. Mass. 2002). 
 239 Id. at 40. 
 240 Id. at 47. 
 241 See Haas, supra note 219, at 1949 (asserting that Geier “provides clear 
guidelines to lower courts” in handling preemption cases).  
 242 Geier v. Am. Honda Motors Co., 529 U.S. 861, 907 (2000) (Stevens, J. 
dissenting).  
 243 See, e.g., Great Dane v. Wells, 52 S.W.3d 737, 749 (Tex. 2001) (stating that 
the plaintiff’s claim that the defendant’s car trailer had been defectively designed with 
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courts have often done so based on Justice Breyer’s central 
observation that FMVSS 208 offered manufacturers a choice,244 
without which the regulation would have represented a 
minimum standard above which the states were free to 
regulate.245  
This principle of choice versus minimum standards has 
most clearly been displayed in recent cases involving a variety 
of Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standards (FMVSSs). Since all 
the FMVSSs are propagated under the Safety Act, the 
arguments in these cases have not been over the preemptive 
reach of the express preemption clause,246 but rather whether 
the regulation was intended to offer the manufacturer a choice 
or only set a minimum standard.247 If the regulation was not 
intended to provide a choice, courts have often decided that the 
state action is not preempted.248  
The diverging outcome of two Eighth Circuit cases, 
Harris v. Great Dane249 and Griffith v. General Motors,250 is just 
  
too little reflective tape was not implicitly preempted by FMVSS 108, which regulated 
the amount of tape that should appear on car trailers, because that regulation was only 
a minimum standard); Rogers v. Cosco, Inc., 737 N.E.2d 1158, 1166 (Ind. Ct. App. 
2000) (holding that FMVSS 213’s allowance of the use of a booster seat, but not 
requiring its use, represented only a minimum standard, and the plaintiff’s action to 
prohibit the use of booster seats for children under forty pounds represented a 
permissible attempt to impose a greater safety standard than that advocated by the 
DOT).  
 244 Geier, 529 U.S. at 881 (holding that the plaintiff’s claim would have 
established a duty on the part of all manufacturers to install airbags in their 1987 cars, 
thereby conflicting with the DOT’s intended mix of restraint devices, in effect taking 
away from the manufacturers their choice in what restraint system to use). 
 245 Id. at 868 (arguing that the express preemption clause, without the saving 
clause, would preempt all state actions except those that sought to regulate a matter 
for which the federal regulation represented only a “minimum safety standard”). 
 246 Every court that has examined this question has so far ruled that Geier is 
controlling over the Safety Act’s express preemption clause as it applied to all FMVSSs. 
See e.g., Harris v. Great Dane Trailers, 234 F.3d 398, 399 (8th Cir. 2000) (“Great Dane 
concedes that Geier thereby overruled the district court’s decision that Harris’ claim 
against Great Dane is expressly preempted.”).  
 247 E.g., Rogers, 737 N.E.2d at 1165-66 (discussing only this issue of choice 
versus minimum standards in its analysis of the regulations implied preemption 
scope). 
 248 Stone v. Frontier Airlines Inc., 256 F. Supp. 2d 28, 43-44 (D. Mass. 2002) 
(stating that the FAA’s regulations represented only a minimum standard, and that in 
light of the Act’s saving clause, and in line with the holding in Geier, a minimum 
standard was not sufficient to find that the state action would actually conflict with the 
federal standard).  
 249 234 F.3d 398 (8th Cir. 2000). The plaintiff in this case claimed that the 
defendant had defectively designed their car trailer with too little reflective tape, which 
ultimately caused her husband’s fatal crash. Id. at 399. The defendant responded that 
it had complied with the DOT’s regulations regarding reflective devices on car trailers, 
and that those regulations implicitly preempted the plaintiff’s claim. Id. 
 250 303 F.3d 1276 (8th Cir. 2002). The plaintiff claimed that defendant had 
 
 2/28/2005 2:15:30 PM 
986 BROOKLYN LAW REVIEW [Vol. 70:3 
one example of the principle of choice versus minimum 
standards. In Harris, the Circuit Court was interpreting the 
preemptive effects of MFVSS 108, a DOT safety standard 
governing lamps and reflective devices.251 While following 
Geier’s interpretation of the Safety Act’s express preemption 
and saving clauses,252 the Eighth Circuit distinguished Geier on 
the grounds that, unlike FMVSS 208 in Geier, the regulation at 
issue in Harris only established a minimum standard, and was 
not intended to provide manufacturers with a choice.253 The 
Circuit Court held that FMVSS 108 did not prohibit the 
addition of more reflective tape than the minimum amount 
required.254 The court found that defendant could have been 
negligent under state law for designing its trailer with only the 
minimum amount of federally required reflective devices.255  
In contrast to Harris, the Eighth Circuit in Griffith was 
asked to examine different aspect of FMVSS 208—namely, the 
requirement that some seats in trucks have either a two-point 
or three-point seat belt.256 As in Harris, the Eighth Circuit 
Court in Griffith held that the state action might be implicitly 
preempted despite the fact that no express preemption was 
found.257 The Eighth Circuit framed its decision as a simple 
question of whether the regulation was intended as a minimum 
standard or whether the regulation established a choice that 
the state was forbidden from precluding.258 With this as its 
ideological framework the court drew a comparison between 
the part of the regulation in Geier and the part in this case.259 
The Eighth Circuit found that the DOT had intended the 
  
defectively designed their 1990 Chevrolet Silverado pickup truck because they had 
chosen a two-point seat belt for the middle front passenger seat. Id. at 1278. The 
defendant countered by saying that FMVSS 208 had specifically allowed them to select 
a two-point seat belt for that seat, and therefore the plaintiff’s claim was preempted. 
Id. 
 251 Harris, 234 F.3d at 399.  
 252 Id.  
 253 Id. at 403 (rejecting the defendant’s argument that during the period the 
DOT was studying the effectiveness of FMVSS 108, that all common law standards 
were implicitly preempted; instead holding that the standard required only a minimum 
amount of reflective tape, and that any state could, through common law action, 
require a greater amount or different configuration of the tape without interfering with 
the DOT objectives for the standard).  
 254 Id. at 401. 
 255 Id.  
 256 Griffith v. General Motors, 303 F.3d 1276, 1279 (8th Cir. 2002).  
 257 Id.  
 258 Id. at 1280-81 (declaring that the issue in the case is one of intent). 
 259 Id. at 1281-82 (citing Hurley v. Motor Coach Indus., Inc., 222 F.3d 377, 382 
(7th Cir.2000) (supporting the Eighth Circuit’s current holding)). 
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sections of FMVSS 208 at issue in Griffith to have given auto 
manufacturers a choice of what type of seat belt to use.260 
Consequently, the Circuit Court held that if the plaintiff’s 
action were allowed to proceed, the state would effectively be 
eliminating the manufacturer’s ability to choose by declaring 
that only one type of seat belt was appropriate.261 As a result, 
the court declared that Geier did apply and that the state 
action was implicitly preempted.262 
Outside of the confines of the Safety Act, this doctrine of 
choice versus minimum standard has been used by courts to 
limit the implied preemptive effects of several other federal 
regulations. As has been shown above, the Tenth Circuit in 
Choate v. Champion Home Builders263 found that the federal 
regulation requiring hard-wired smoke detectors set only a 
minimum standard and did not present homebuilders with a 
choice.264 Consequently, the Circuit Court held that the Housing 
Construction Act did not preempt the plaintiff’s common law 
action.265  
Another example comes from Stone v. Frontier Airlines, 
Inc.266 In Stone, the District Court of Massachusetts ruled that 
the Federal Aviation Administration’s (FAA) regulation 
requiring defibrillators on all airplanes did not preempt the 
plaintiff’s state common law action.267 The District Court 
examined the regulation and stated that the regulation was a 
minimum safety standard.268 The court specifically 
distinguished Geier by noting that the FAA’s regulation did not 
give the airlines a choice of safety devices.269 Rather, the 
District Court ruled that the regulation merely required the 
airlines to carry defibrillators by a certain date, and the history 
  
 260 Id. at 1282 (holding that the DOT had intended to offer manufacturers a 
choice of what restraint system they used, and since the plaintiff’s action would 
mandate the choice of one option over another, such action would conflict with the 
DOT’s intent for the regulation).  
 261 Griffith, 303 F.3d at 1282. In so holding, the Eighth Circuit rejected the 
plaintiff’s argument that Geier should not apply because in this case the DOT had not 
explicitly said that its goal was the gradual phase-in of one particular type of restraint 
system. Id. at 1280. Instead, the Circuit Court held that, in accordance with the 
holding in Geier, so long as there was a choice offered that was what was controlling, 
and no analysis as to why that choice was offered was required. Id. at 1282. 
 262 Id. at 1282.  
 263 222 F.3d 788 (10th Cir. 2000).  
 264 See discussion supra Part V.A.  
 265 Choate v. Champion House Builders, 222 F.3d 788, 790 (10th Cir. 2000).  
 266 256 F. Supp. 2d 28 (D. Mass. 2002). 
 267 Id. at 43.  
 268 Id.  
 269 Id. at 44. 
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of the regulation showed that a tort law requiring an earlier 
adoption date would not conflict with this objective.270  
These cases may not all mention the presumption 
against preemption by name, but their eventual outcomes 
adhere to the basic concepts that underlie the presumption. 
The cases show a proper, limited interpretation of the Geier 
precedent.271 This interpretation preserves the federal desire to 
regulate uniformly while still allowing the states to compensate 
their victims.272 By asserting that minimum federal standards 
alone do not preempt state actions, cases like Choate and 
Harris have properly circumscribed the power of federal 
agencies to preempt state common law actions.273 At the same 
time, by recognizing that agencies can still preempt state laws 
when its objective is to offer a choice, or both a minimum and 
maximum, cases like Griffith and others have permitted 
agencies to promulgate and administer regulations in a 
uniform manner.274  
C. Sprietsma v. Mercury Marine 
In 2002, just two years after Geier was decided, the 
Supreme Court granted certiorari in the case, Sprietsma v. 
Mercury Marine.275 The Court’s unanimous holding in 
Sprietsma276 showed how the interpretation of the express 
preemption and implied preemption clauses established in 
Geier is both appropriate and flexible when interpreted 
correctly. 
  
 270 Id.  
 271 Robert M. N. Palmer, The Auto-Safety Preemption War Since Geier, TRIAL, 
Nov. 2001, at 48, 50-51 (citing Harris v. Great Dane, Griffith v. Gen. Motors Corp, and 
Rogers v. Cosco as all correctly interpreting Geier as standing for preemption in a 
limited set of circumstances). 
 272 See Bough & Johnson, supra note 56, at 34 (declaring that Geier stands as 
an example of a limited application of the implied preemption doctrine). The major 
victory in Geier, from a state and victims rights standpoint, was that the majority 
rejected Honda’s argument of express preemption. Id. At the same time the holding 
also still allowed the federal government to mandate options and phase-in programs. 
Id.  
 273 See Palmer, supra note 274, at 50. 
 274 See Gary T. Schwartz, Considering the Proper Federal Role in American 
Tort Law, 38 ARIZ. L. REV. 917, 930 (1996) (arguing that the vast differences that have 
developed between the states in the area of product liability means that it is time the 
federal government step in and apply more uniform “mature and experienced decision 
making”). 
 275 534 U.S. 1112 (2002), cert. granted.  
 276 Sprietsma v. Mercury Marine, 537 U.S. 51 (2002).  
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Mrs. Jeanne Sprietsma died in 1995 when she fell off a 
small ski boat and was struck by the outboard motor’s 
propeller, which had been manufactured by Mercury Marine 
(Mercury).277 Mrs. Sprietsma’s husband filed a product liability 
tort claim alleging that the motor had been defectively 
designed because it lacked a propeller guard.278 Mercury 
responded to the charges by claiming that the Federal Boat 
Safety Act of 1971 (FBSA) preempted Sprietsma’s claims.279 
Before Geier had been decided, the Illinois trial court and the 
Illinois intermediate appellate court had agreed with Mercury’s 
interpretation of the FBSA’s express preemption clause and 
dismissed Sprietsma’s claim.280 However, after Geier was 
decided, the Illinois Supreme Court, interpreting Geier, 
overturned the appellate court and declared that Sprietsma’s 
claims were implicitly preempted.281 The Supreme Court 
subsequently granted certiorari.282 
Justice Stevens, the author of the dissent in Geier, 
delivered the unanimous opinion in Sprietsma.283 According to 
him, three issues had to be resolved. The first issue was 
whether the FBSA expressly preempted common law tort 
claims.284 The second issue was whether the Coast Guard’s 
decision not to regulate propeller guards implicitly preempted 
the common law claims.285 The last issue was whether the 
potential conflict between state and federal regulation of 
propeller guards would be significant enough to overcome the 
presumption against preemption.286  
Similar to Geier, Justice Stevens began his analysis in 
Sprietsma by looking at the language of the FBSA, its history, 
and that of the regulation in question. In relevant part, the 
  
 277 Id. at 54.  
 278 Id. at 55. A propeller guard is one of a set of “propeller injury avoidance 
devices.” The purpose of these devices is to reduce the risk that boat propellers pose to 
individuals in the water. There are at least four different types of propeller guards, 
most of which are designed to deflect large objects away from the spinning propellers. 
See United States Coast Guard, Boating Articles: Propeller Injury Risk Reduction, 
available at http://www.uscgboating.org/articles/boatingview.aspx?id=67 (describing 
the various types of propeller guards and listing each type’s advantages and 
disadvantages) (last visited Feb. 10, 2005).  
 279 46 U.S.C. §§ 4301-4311 (2000) [hereinafter FBSA]. 
 280 Sprietsma, 537 U.S. at 55. 
 281 Id. 
 282 Sprietsma v. Mercury Marine, 534 U.S. 1112 (2002). 
 283 Sprietsma, 537 U.S. at 53.  
 284 Id. at 56. 
 285 Id.  
 286 Id.  
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FBSA created an advisory council which provided 
recommendations to the Coast Guard on all proposed 
regulations under the act.287 The council was charged with 
considering several factors, such as the “extent to which [a] 
proposed regulation will contribute to boating safety” 288 and 
whether the proposed regulation will “compel substantial 
alteration of recreational vessel[s] . . . .”289 The process that led 
to the Coast Guard’s ultimate decision not to issue a 
requirement for propeller guards began in 1988. At that time, 
due to the perceived high number of individuals injured in 
propeller-related accidents, the Coast Guard initiated an 
inquiry into whether it should require the installation of 
guards.290 After a long study of the propeller guard issue, a 
subcommittee of the advisory council recommended that the 
Coast Guard “‘take no regulatory action to require propeller 
guards.’”291 The Coast Guard followed this recommendation.292  
After examining this history, Justice Stevens next 
looked at the FBSA’s preemptive power. He began by 
examining the act’s construction.293 Like the Safety Act in Geier, 
the FBSA had both an express preemption clause and a saving 
clause.294 He declared that the phrasing of the preemption 
clause indicated that it was not intended to preempt common 
law actions.295 Justice Stevens stated further that, in accordance 
with Geier, the determination not to preempt common law 
actions was “buttresse[d]” by the FBSA’s saving clause.296 As a 
  
 287 Id. at 58. 
 288 Sprietsma, 537 U.S. at 58. 
 289 Id. at 58 n.7. 
 290 Id. at 60. In the opinion Justice Stevens noted that there were conflicting 
figures given for the number of persons injured by propeller accidents each year. The 
number ranging from around 100 accidents per year to more than 2,000. Id. at 60 n.8.  
 291 Id. at 61 (quoting Brief for Appellant at 43). 
 292 Id. at 61-62. In 2001 the advisory council recommended changes to this 
policy as it pertains to “planing vessels 12 feet to 26 feet in length.” However as of the 
time of the opinion the Coast Guard had not acted on this recommendation. Id. at 62 
(quoting 66 Fed. Reg. 63645, 63647). 
 293 Sprietsma, 537 U.S. at 56. 
 294 Id. at 58-59. 
 295 Id. at 62-63. This declaration that the express preemption clause would not 
have preempted common law actions is different than the interpretation Justice Breyer 
had of the Safety Act’s express preemption clause. See Geier v. Am. Honda Motors Co., 
529 U.S. 861, 868 (2000) (stating that without the saving clause the express 
preemption clause would have preempted all common law actions). This discrepancy 
arises from the different terms used in each preemption clause. The FBSA refers to 
preempting “law[s] or regulation[s],” Sprietsma, 537 U.S. at 63, whereas the Safety Act 
referred to preempting “safety standard[s].” Geier, 529 U.S. at 868.  
 296 Sprietsma, 537 U.S. at 63.  
 2/28/2005 2:15:30 PM 
2005] NOT AS BAD AS WE THOUGHT 991 
result, Justice Stevens wrote that the FBSA does not expressly 
preempt state common law actions.297  
Justice Stevens then proceeded to examine whether 
Sprietsma’s action was implicitly preempted. He stated that 
“[i]t is quite wrong to view [the Coast Guard’s] decision [not to 
require propeller guards] as the functional equivalent of a 
regulation prohibiting all States . . . from adopting such a 
regulation.”298 An examination of the history of the act suggests 
that when the Coast Guard chose not to regulate in an area 
they presumed that the state could still do so.299 In addition, the 
Coast Guard cited as a major reason for rejecting the propeller 
guard regulation, the fact that not enough data was available 
to justify what would be a technically difficult and expensive 
regulation to impose.300 This was not an indication that the 
Coast Guard believed it was a bad idea to have propeller 
guards, but rather, under the current agency regulatory 
scheme there was not sufficient evidence to indicate that a 
national mandate was required.301  
Justice Stevens wrote that the Coast Guard’s decision in 
Sprietsma stood in “sharp contrast to the decision . . . given 
pre-emptive effect in Geier . . . .”302 In Sprietsma, the Coast 
Guard had written an amicus curiae brief, informing the 
Justices that the agency did not view the decision as having 
any preemptive effect.303 The Coast Guard’s position on the 
FBSA’s preemptive effect was thus opposite the DOT’s position 
on the preemptive effect of FMVSS 208.304 Justice Stevens 
therefore held that, in accordance with Geier, there would be no 
conflict between the Coast Guard’s intent in not regulating 
propeller guards and Sprietsma’s common law state action, 
which might mandate such a device.305  
  
 297 Id. at 63-65 (using Geier’s assertion that “an express preemption clause 
‘does not bar the ordinary working of conflict preemption principles.’”). 
 298 Id. at 65. 
 299 Id. at 65-66. Shortly after the FBSA took effect the Secretary of 
Transportation issued a statement that all then-existing state laws were exempt from 
being preempted by the FBSA. Id. at 59. Every time that the Coast Guard has issued 
new regulations since they have limited the scope of this blanket exemption to those 
“[s]tate statutes and regulations” that are not otherwise covered by a federal 
regulation. Id. (citing 38 Fed. Reg. 6914-6915).  
 300 Sprietsma, 537 U.S. at 66. 
 301 Id. at 66-67. (stating that the decision was made within the “FBSA’s 
‘stringent’ criteria for federal regulation”).  
 302 Id. at 67.  
 303 Id. at 68. 
 304 See discussion supra Part III.B.  
 305 Sprietsma, 537 U.S. at 68. 
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The Court’s holding in Sprietsma confirms the 
suggestion that the Geier decision is a somewhat limited 
decision which represents a balancing of federal and state 
needs, and an approach that other courts should use in 
evaluating the preemptive effects of laws containing both an 
express preemption clause and a saving clause.306 Sprietsma 
highlights how implied preemption, combined with the implicit 
use of the presumption against preemption, will allow courts to 
balance the needs of both the federal government in 
uniformity, and the states in protecting their citizens.307 Finally, 
the decision also demonstrates how the Court has chosen to 
defer to the opinion of various agencies regarding the 
preemptive effects of their regulations.308 In the end, Sprietsma 
is a strong indication that Geier allows, but does not require, a 
finding of implied preemption.309 
VI.  CONCLUSION 
The Supreme Court’s decision in Geier was an 
important but limited holding. While Geier is most likely to be 
remembered for its interpretation of the express preemption 
and saving clauses, the precedent Geier established has not 
greatly changed the balance between federal and state 
regulations. The decision did not eradicate the presumption 
against preemption, nor did it create a situation where the 
federal regulation will more frequently preempt the state. The 
  
 306 See id. at 63-64 (referencing Geier in discussing how the FBSA’s saving 
clause supports the Court’s reading of the express preemption clause to not include 
common law actions). 
 307 See id. at 65-66 (holding that, in light of the FBSA’s stringent criteria for 
federal regulation, the Coast Guard’s decision to not regulate propeller guards should 
not be viewed as the equivalent of a decision to not allow propeller guards). This 
conclusion was fully consistent with the FBSA’s history of preserving state regulatory 
authority in areas where the federal government had not yet regulated. Id. at 65.  
 308 See id. at 68 (declaring that because the Court’s reasoning in Sprietsma 
centrally revolved around the opinion of the Coast Guard, that the holding was 
strongly supported by its reasoning in Geier). 
 309 See discussion supra Part V. 
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Supreme Court’s decision that FSVMM 208 preempted state 
action represents one point on the preemption spectrum, a 
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